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In recent years, many companies in the United States have issued so-called 
“Future-Priced Convertible Securities.”  These companies tend to be small, thinly-traded, 
and (most importantly) desperate for cash, and look to the Future-Priced Convertible 
Security as a necessary means of financing to keep their businesses operating. Future-
Priced Convertible Securities are thus credited by some with providing an important form 
of financing in the marketplace.1  Yet these securities are also a source of controversy.  
Many companies have wound up regretting issuing these instruments, after watching their 
stock values tumble and their market capitalizations dry-up subsequent to issuing these 
securities.  Issuers have even started to sue.  
Many issuers of Future-Priced Convertible Securities are now suing the very 
purchasers of these securities alleging, among other things, that the purchasers have 
violated antifraud provisions of the federal securities laws such as Section 10(b) of the 
Securities Exchange Act of 1934.2  These cases often allege similar ways by which the 
purchasers of the Future-Priced Convertible Securities allegedly harmed the issuers, 
giving rise to a unique appellation for these lawsuits: “death spiral” litigation.3  These 
cases are called “death spirals” because the investors of the Future Priced Convertible 
Securities are alleged to have used the securities in manipulative short-selling schemes 
that extract the market value of the issuing companies, thereby enriching the purchasers at 
1 See generally Beloreshki et al., The Frontiers of Convertible Financing: An Economic and Legal 
Perspective on Litigating Future Priced Securities, NERA Working Paper, July 30, 2003, available at
http://www.nera.com/_template.cfm?c=6167&o=6066.
2
 15 U.S.C. 78j (2004).
3
 Beloreshki et al., supra note 1, at 19.  This issue has also received some coverage in the media, including 
a recent article in The Economist magazine.  See Toxic Finance, ECONOMIST, Sept. 6, 2003, at 66.
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the expense of issuers and other shareholders.  These “death spirals” can result in the 
issuer’s being de-listed from an exchange or even forced into bankruptcy.
This paper will analyze six specific death spiral lawsuits with the intention of 
evaluating the plaintiffs’ securities fraud claims.  In so doing, this paper hopes to provide 
insight into the potential success of other lawsuits in an anticipated “wave of litigation” 
over Future-Priced Convertible Securities.4  Part I of this paper provides background 
information on these securities: what they are, who issues them, who buys them, and why. 
Part II then discusses an important legal issue relating to death spirals, the practice and 
the law of short selling.  Short selling is at the heart of recent litigation over these 
securities, and a firm understanding of short selling is necessary for this study.  Next, Part 
III reviews six specific death spiral cases, analyzing the facts and claims alleged in these 
lawsuits and providing some basic conclusions of law.  The Analysis section, Part IV, 
then examines the legal merits of these death spiral securities fraud complaints in detail.5
Using the six lawsuits discussed in Part III as case studies, the Analysis section 
demonstrates that death spiral litigation securities claims are potentially meritorious.  
Moreover, this paper will argue at some length that naked short selling should be declared 
to be market manipulation if (more likely, when) this issue arises in a death spiral action. 
Finally, Part V reviews some of the regulatory concerns affecting Future Priced Securities 
and will discuss the significance of the Securities and Exchange Commission’s recently 
4 E.g., Toxic Finance, supra note 3, at 66.  See also Brandon Copple, Sinking Funds, FORBES, June 10, 
2002, at 46.
5
 The reader is reminded at the outset that death spiral lawsuits allege many different claims, including 
securities fraud and other violations of federal securities laws, civil violations of the Racketeering 
Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, violations of state securities laws, and common law tort, breach 
of contract, and breach of fiduciary duty claims.  Yet the purpose of this paper is to focus narrowly on just 
the federal securities fraud claims.  Thus, all the other claims raised in death spiral lawsuits aside from 
issues of federal securities fraud are beyond the scope of this paper and will not be examined.
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proposed Regulation SHO.  This paper concludes that death spiral lawsuits have merit, 
though there are complicated legal issues that must be evaluated on the way to a 
plaintiff’s recovery.
Part I – Background
A)  What Are Future-Priced (“Death Spiral”) Convertible Securities?
Future-Priced Convertible Securities are a recent financial creation issued by 
many small companies in the United States.  These securities have a variety of names, 
including “Future Priced Securities,”6 “Floating-Priced Convertibles,”7 “Private 
Investments in Public Equities” (variously, “Structured PIPEs,” or “Toxic PIPEs”),8
“Resetting Convertibles,9 “Floorless Convertibles,”10 and, ignominiously, “Toxic” or 
“Death Spiral Convertibles.”11  But all these names refer to essentially the same types of 
security.  (This paper will refer to these instruments as Future-Priced Convertible 
Securities and Future-Priced Securities interchangeably, or simply “FPS’s” for short.)
Future Priced Securities are a form of last-resort financing for companies that 
cannot raise money through more traditional debt or equity offerings or through bank 
borrowing.12  Firms that issue FPS’s tend to have no alternative.13  The following SEC 
Release provides a general introduction to these securities.  
6 See, e.g., Beloreshki et al., supra note 1, at 1. 
7 See, e.g., Pierre Hillon & Theo Vermaelen, Death Spiral Convertibles, J. FIN. ECON. (forthcoming) 
(manuscript at 2), available at http://jfe.rochester.edu/03026.pdf. 
8 See, e.g., Leib M. Lerner, Disclosing Toxic PIPES: Why the SEC Can and Should Expand the Reporting 
Requirements Surrounding Private Investments in Public Equities, 58 BUS. LAW. 655 (2003).
9 See, e.g., Cynthia Webb, Help Comes With a High Price, WASH. POST, April 16, 2001, at E1.
10 See, e.g., Toxic Finance, supra note 3, at 66.
11 See, e.g., Securities & Exchange Commission Press Release 2003-36, SEC Settles with Rhino Advisors, 
Thomas Badian, Feb. 27, 2003, available at http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2003-26.htm.
12 See, e.g., Lee R. Petillon & Robert Joe Hull, REPRESENTING START-UP COMPANIES, § 10:16 (2003).
13 See infra Part I.B.
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Future Priced Securities are private financing instruments which were 
created as an alternative means of quickly raising capital for issuers.  The 
security is generally structured in the form of a convertible security and is 
often issued via a private placement.  ...  The conversion price of the 
Future Priced Security is generally linked to a percentage discount to the 
market price of the underlying common stock at the time of conversion 
and accordingly the conversion rate for Future Priced Securities floats with 
the market price of the common stock.  As such, the lower the price of the 
issuer’s common stock at the time of conversion, the more shares into 
which the Future Priced Security is convertible.14
The distinguishing characteristic of FPS’s is this convertibility into a fixed value
of the issuer’s common stock.  This is, of course, different from traditional convertible 
securities (whether bonds or preferred stock) that are convertible into fixed numbers of 
shares.  For example, a Future Priced Security could be convertible into $10 million of 
common stock at a future date, thereby giving the holder one million shares at conversion 
if the stock’s price is $10/share or 10 million shares if the security is trading at $1/share.15
This convertibility into a fixed value of equity with an indeterminate number of shares is 
the distinguishing characteristic of Future Priced Securities.  
Aside from this common feature, Future Priced Securities can contain a variety of 
rights and obligations for issuers and purchasers because FPS’s are ultimately creatures of 
contract.  A recent report by Pierre Hillon and Theo Vermaelen, two professors at the 
French academy INSEAD, studied 467 Future Priced Securities offerings between 1994 
and 1998 and identified a number of common themes among these offerings.16  This 
paper adopts some of the common themes identified by these authors into a “classic case” 
or “standard case” Future-Priced Convertible Security, which this paper will repeatedly 
14
 Self-Regulatory Organizations, Securities and Exchange Commission, Exchange Act Release No. 34-
41337 (April 27, 1999), available at 1999 SEC Lexis 862, at 2 (emphasis added).
15 See id. at 3.
16
 Hillon & Vermaelen, supra note 7, at 4. 
- 5 -
refer to as a benchmark for studying these instruments.  Specifically, “classic case” FPS’s 
are defined hereinafter to have the following characteristics.17
First, and most importantly, the classic case FPS will be convertible into a fixed 
value of the issuer’s common stock.  This is of course the hallmark of a Future Priced 
Security.18  Second, FPS’s generally do not pay interest (for bond FPS’s) or dividends 
(for preferred stock FPS’s) in cash.  Instead, they pay “in kind” through a conversion 
discount—that is, the investor is able to convert the security into a greater value of shares 
than the face amount invested.19  This paper will assume an average conversion discount 
of 15% for the classic case FPS, based on the Hillon/Vermaelen study.20  Third, the 
classic case FPS will contain restrictions on the number of shares into which the security 
is convertible.21  This cap will be bounded at a minimum by the number of shares 
authorized by the company’s articles of incorporation but not yet issued and 
outstanding.22
Fourth, FPS contracts usually limit the time periods during which conversion may 
occur. 23  The contracts create conversion “windows” that smooth the conversions over 
time to prevent a spike in the average trading volume of th e company’s common stock.  
Fifth, and most importantly, most FPS contracts do not prevent purchasers from short 
17
 The Hillon & Vermaelen report identified six common characteristics of FPS’s: lock-up periods, 
conversion discounts, look-back ratios, caps and floors, warrants, and short selling restrictions.  See id. at 
30-33.  Many of these are not relevant for purposes of this paper, however, as they relate to the economics 
of FPS’s, not their legal characteristics. 
18 See supra text accompanying notes 14-15.
19 See Hillon & Vermaelen, supra note 7, at 3.  
20
 The Hillon & Vermaelen study found that the average conversion discount in 467 FPS’s was 15.5%.  See 
id. at 30.  Thus, a 15% conversion discount would provide a return of 15% if conversion took place exactly 
one year after the security was issued.
21 See id. at 32.
22
 The reason for this is that the company cannot issue more shares than authorized in its articles of 
incorporation.  
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selling.  For instance, the Hillon/Vermaelen study of 467 FPS’s found restrictions on 
short selling in only 58 of the offerings.24  Similarly, out of the six death spiral cases 
examined in Part III and IV of this paper, only two issuers prevented short selling by the 
FPS purchasers (while a third attempted to limit it).25  Thus, our classic case FPS will 
contain no short selling restrictions.      
B)  Who Issues Future-Priced Convertible Securities and Why?
Future Priced Securities are a form of last-resort financing for companies that 
have nowhere else to turn in the marketplace (a finance professor at Columbia University 
has called them “desperation financing”).26  The issuers of these securities tend to be 
small, young, and risky technology firms—i.e., firms that have nowhere else to turn.27
For example, the Hillon/Vermaelen study found that 50% of the 261 companies in the 
study were either technology or medical service providers and that the average market 
capitalization of the 467 firms was $67.5 million.28  It is unclear exactly how many firms 
have ever issued an FPS, but the number of offerings has evidently dropped-off in recent 
years from a high of (by one count) 395 offerings worth $3.2 billion in 2000.29
Companies such as eToys, DrKoop.com, eFax, and At Home are perhaps among the more 
recognizable names of FPS issuers.30
Issuing an FPS is generally done as a last-resort because, as will be examined in 
Part III and IV of this paper, FPS’s leave the issuer open to abuse.  The Hillon/ 
23 See Hillon & Vermaelen, supra note 7, at 30.
24 Id. at 32-33.
25 See infra notes 145-49 and accompanying text. 
26 See Janice Revell, A Most Sinister Form of Financing, FORTUNE, Dec. 24, 2001, at 160.
27 See Hillon & Vermaelen, supra note 7, at 4.
28 Id. at 17.
29 See Matthew McClearn, The Mysterious World of Death-Spiral Finance, TORONTO STAR, Oct. 15, 2002, 
at B1.
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Vermaelen report provides empirical evidence for this: 85% of the firms studied saw 
declines in their stock prices within the first year of issuing an FPS, and these declines 
averaged 34%.31  Yet companies may feel that they have no choice but to issue an FPS if 
the alternative is closing the firm.  (This perhaps explains why some companies have 
issued multiple FPS’s, even after suffering stock losses as a result of prior deals.)32 But 
the heyday of the Future Priced Security appears to be over.  As one market participant 
has noted, this is “a business that doesn’t exist any more, because everybody got tired of 
losing money.  …  Public companies themselves have eliminated this from the market.  
They just won’t do these types of deals any more, with anybody.”33
C)  Who Buys Future Priced Securities?
Private investment groups such as hedge funds or venture capital firms are the 
main purchasers of Future Priced Securities.  Issuers of FPS’s sell them to private 
purchasers because this avoids the onerous requirements of a registered securities offering 
and allows the issuer to achieve its financing objectives quickly and efficiently.34  Most 
FPS’s thus qualify under one of the many exemptions from registration within the 
Securities Act of 1933.  There are a number of funds that appear to specialize in FPS 
offerings, including Thomson Kernaghan, Promethean Investment Group, HFTP 
Investment LLC, Fisher Capital Ltd., Wingate Capital Ltd., and Southridge Capital 
30 See Cory Johnson, Wall Street’s Toxic Tool, THE INDUSTRY STANDARD, March 19, 2001.
31 See Hillon & Vermaelen, supra note 7, at 4.
32
 For example, Nanopierce Technologies, discussed in Part III.A infra, issued an FPS to detrimental effect, 
but then went ahead and issued another FPS one year later.  See Nanopierce Tech., Inc. v. Promethean 
Asset Mgmt, LLC, No. 00-CV-6218, 2002 WL 31819207, at 1-2 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 10, 2001).  Similarly, 
Hillon/Vermaelen report that twenty companies out of 261 in their study issued at least four FPS’s.  See 
Hillon & Vermaelen, supra note 7, at 17.
33
 McClearn, supra note 29, at B1.
34 See, e.g., Lerner, supra note 8, at 662-64.
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Management LLC.35  One investor that has appeared in news articles regarding FPS’s is 
Mark Valentine, a former chairman of the firm Thomson Kernaghan.36  Valentine 
apparently participated in approximately 150 FPS offerings prior to being subject to 
criminal proceedings by United States and Canadian authorities (and being a defendant in 
multiple private lawsuits).37
D)  “Death Spiral” Litigation – Who Is Suing Whom?
It is often the case in securities fraud litigation that purchasers of a security will 
sue the issuers or underwriters, alleging fraud in the security’s offer or sale.  But Future 
Priced Securities litigation—“death spiral” litigation—turns this on its head.  In death 
spiral lawsuits, the issuers of FPS’s are suing the purchasers (as well as, in come cases, 
brokers and market makers).38  Part III and Part IV of this paper examine death spiral 
litigation in detail, but a few themes may be gleaned at the outset.  
Issuers of Future-Priced Convertible Securities are suing the purchasers of these 
securities, alleging that the purchasers lied to the issuers and manipulated the price of the 
issuers’ common stock through short selling.  Purchasers allegedly reaped large short-
term profits, at the expense of the company and other shareholders.  The basic scheme 
underlying these “death spiral” claims is quite simple.  
35 See Short Sales: Death Spiral Stock Cost Placement Firm $1.2 Million, Suit Alleges, 9 No. 10 ANDREWS 
DERIVATIVES LITIG. REP. 3 (April 21, 2003); McClearn, supra note 29, at B1.  In the author’s research, he 
has come across these names a number of times, often in the context of litigation over FPS’s.
36 See McClearn, supra note 29, at B1.
37 See id. at B1 (stating that Valentine has been arrested by the Federal Bureau of Investigation and indicted 
for wire, mail and securities fraud and suspended by Canadian securities authorities).
38
 For instance, JAG Media Holdings, discussed in Part III.A, is suing 152 named defendants, including the 
purchasers of its Future Priced Security, brokers, and other parties.  See JAG Media Holdings, Inc. v. A.G. 
Edwards & Sons, Inc. et al., No. 02-CV-2867 (S.D. Tex.), Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint and Jury 
Demand, filed Nov. 22, 2002.
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The key to a death spiral scheme is that the FPS purchaser is entitled to a 
predetermined value of the issuer’s common stock through the Future Priced Security.  
Thus, if the issuer’s stock decreases in price, the FPS purchaser is entitled to that many 
more shares upon conversion.  Issuers allege that purchasers have used this to their 
advantage by, for instance, engaging in massive short selling of the issuers stock to 
intentionally depress the stock’s price.  Then, after a few weeks or months when the 
issuer’s stock has fallen (sometimes to nothing), the purchasers convert their FPS’s into 
huge numbers of shares, covering their short positions.  Indeed, because of the way FPS’s 
operate, purchasers have an incentive to short sell: the lower the stock’s price, the more 
shares the FPS purchaser can achieve at conversion and, since the return is fixed, the 
more shares that can be used to cover short-selling positions. 
Moreover, FPS purchasers are able to effectuate these “death spirals” because the 
issuers are small, thinly traded over-the-counter companies that likely have too few 
buyers to sustain the prices of their securities in the face of the FPS purchasers’ huge 
short selling positions.  Thus, prices inevitably fall.  Part II will also explain how the 
absence of pricing rules in many of the over-the-counter securities markets means that 
there are no regulatory barriers to the FPS purchasers’ abusive activities.  Issuers thus 
allege that the FPS purchasers reap huge short-term profits by essentially draining the 
issuer’s market capitalization and leaving the issuer and innocent investors with a vastly 
deflated stock price, making de-listing of the issuer—or even bankruptcy—likely.  This 
set of facts underlying “death spirals” has apparently been repeated many times,39 and has 
39 See, e.g., McClearn, supra note 29.
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received the attention of the Securities and Exchange Commission.40  This paper will now 
turn to an examination of short selling, the context through which death spirals are 
alleged to occur. 
Part II – The Practice & The Law of Short-Selling
A)  The Practice of Short Selling
The basic principles underlying short selling are fairly simple.41  A short sale is 
the sale of a security that the seller does not yet own (or owns but chooses not to 
deliver).42  The short seller instead borrows the security from another market participant, 
delivering the borrowed security to the short-sale purchaser and thereby completing the 
short.  The short seller will then be obligated to return the securities to the lender—i.e., to 
“cover” the short—by repurchasing equivalent securities in the marketplace at some later 
date and delivering these securities to the lender.  Covering completes the short sale 
process: the lender and purchaser each will own the security, while the short seller 
(hopefully) will earn a profit.  The short seller will earn a profit on the short sale if the 
stock’s price falls between the time of the short sale and the time the short seller covers.  
This also demonstrates that short selling is very risky: if the stock price rises after the 
40
 See Securities & Exchange Commission Press Release 2003-26, supra note 11, containing the following 
statement from the Associate Director for the Division of Enforcement: “Certain convertible securities, 
particularly those referred to as ‘toxic’ or ‘death spiral’ convertibles, present the temptation for persons 
holding the convertible securities to engage in manipulative short selling of the issuer’s stock in order to 
receive more shares at the time of conversion.”  This press release deals with a settled enforcement action 
against an FPS investor, Rhino Advisors, and its president, Thomas Badian.  This enforcement action 
derived from the facts of the Sedona case, which this paper will examine.  See infra Part III.A and note 123.
41
 For a discussion of short selling practices, see generally Ralph S. Janvey, Short Selling, 20 Sec. Reg. L.J. 
270, 271-76 (1992), and IRVING M. POLLACK, SHORT-SALE REGULATION OF NASDAQ SECURITIES 15-18 
(July 1986).
42
 It is actually possible to short-sell a security that the investor already owns but chooses not to deliver 
through a practice known as “selling against the box.”  Short sales “against the box” otherwise proceed like 
traditional short sales, but the short seller simply holds-on to the securities it already owns.  Short sales 
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short sale, the short seller will be forced to cover the short sale at a higher price, thereby 
covering at a loss.  And since there is theoretically no limit to how high a stock can climb, 
the short sellers loss could potentially be huge.
Short selling has existed for centuries in securities and commodities markets43 and 
is seen to provide at least two market benefits: market liquidity and pricing efficiency.44
First, short selling provides market liquidity (i.e., increased trading opportunities) 
because, other things being equal, short selling increases the number of sellers in the 
marketplace.  This liquidity usually comes from market makers and other market 
specialists who use short sales to offset (and potentially profit from) occasional 
contractions in the supply of a security.45  Second, short selling provides pricing 
efficiency because arbitrageurs can use short sales to equilibrate the price of a security to 
its perceived ‘correct’ value.  For example, if an arbitrageur determines (for whatever 
reason) that the price of a security is too high, the arbitrageur can use short sales as a 
means of profiting from the expected decline in the security’s price.  This short selling 
activity helps the market to price the security ‘correctly.’46  These two perceived short 
selling benefits (liquidity and pricing efficiency) are accepted by the U.S. Securities and 
Exchange Commission.47
against the box are generally used to avoid incurring taxes on the sale of a security that the seller already 
owns or to hedge against risks in a stock portfolio.  See Janvey, supra note 41, at 271 & nn.5, 6.  
43
 See POLLACK, supra note 41, at 20, stating that the Dutch and English evidently regulated short selling as 
long ago as the 1600’s and 1700’s.
44
 Janvey, supra note 41, at 272.  
45 Id.
46
 For a classic example of short selling in action, see Sullivan & Long Inc. v. Scattered Corp., 47 F.3d 857 
(7th Cir. 1995).  
47 See Proposed Rules: Short Sales, Securities and Exchange Commission Proposed Regulation SHO, 
Exchange Act Release No. 34-48709, 68 F.R. 62972, 62974, Nov. 6, 2003, available at 2003 WL 
22507877 [hereinafter SEC Proposed Regulation SHO].
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But just as short selling has market benefits, it is also seen as potentially predatory 
or abusive.  Indeed, concerns about short selling figured prominently in the creation of the 
United States securities laws in the 1930’s.48  Some commentators at the time excoriated 
short sellers as “bear raiders” and blamed them for preventing a recovery from the stock 
market crash of 1929 and for prolonging the effects of the Great Depression.49  Others 
argued that short selling was “a necessary feature of an open market for securities”50 and 
that it was important to distinguish between legitimate and illegitimate short selling.51
“Apparently finding it impossible to discover where the truth lay between the extreme 
views that had been expressed, Congress in §10(a) [of the Securities Exchange Act] 
simply placed the practice of short selling in registered securities under the plenary 
rulemaking authority of the [Securities and Exchange] Commission.”52  Section 10(a) of 
the Exchange Act thus gives the SEC the authority to regulate short selling on the 
nation’s securities exchanges.53
48 See LOUIS LOSS & JOEL SELIGMAN, FUNDAMENTALS OF SECURITIES REGULATION 702 & n.60 (3d ed. 
1995).  See also Jonathan R. Macey et al., 74 CORNELL L. REV. 799, 799 (1989) (stating that, during the 
drafting of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, “Representative Adolph Sabath of Illinois wanted to ban 
all short sales in order to ‘eliminate what we term short selling ... the greatest evil that has been permitted or 
sanctioned by the Government that I know of.’").
49 See 7 LOUIS LOSS & JOEL SELIGMAN, SECURITIES REGULATION 3200 & n.214 (3d ed. 1989).
50 See id. at 3200 & n.213.
51
 See Comments of Richard Whitney, NYSE President, 1931, reprinted in Short Sales of Securities, 
Securities and Exchange Commission Exchange Act Release No. 34-13091 (Dec. 21, 1976), available at 
1976 SEC Lexis 90, at 11.
52 See LOSS & SELIGMAN, supra note 49, at 3201.  It is instructive that Congress placed its discussion of 
short selling in Section 10 of the Exchange Act, “Regulation and Use of Manipulative and Deceptive 
Devices,” and that the subsequent paragraph, Section 10(b), is the Exchange Act’s principle antifraud 
provision.  
53 See David C. Worley, The Regulation of Short Sales: The Long and Short of It, 55 BROOK. L.R. 1255, 
1275 n.75 (1990) (“it appears that the SEC does not have authority under the Exchange Act section 10(a) to 
regulate the short selling of purely OTC stocks since section 10(a) refers to short sales effected in securities 
registered on an exchange…”). This limitation remains in the current text of Sec. 10(a).  See 15 U.S.C. 78j 
(2004). 
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As discussed above, the basic principles of short selling are reasonably simple.  
Yet the practice becomes very complex in the marketplace due to locating and delivery 
issues and margin requirements.  Unfortunately, it is necessary to discuss these complex 
standards in order to fully appreciate the issues involved with Future Priced Securities 
litigation.  Thus, it is to the details of short selling that this paper now turns.
The reader will recall that short selling is possible because of securities 
borrowing.54  To borrow a security, the short seller must have a margin account (as 
opposed to a ‘cash account’) with a securities broker.55  The short seller also must have 
deposited into this account sufficient money or securities to maintain minimum margin 
levels required for the account.56  These minimum margin levels differ for various market 
participants.  For instance, individuals must maintain margin levels of 150% of the value 
of any short selling activity in their margin accounts, while market makers and self-
clearing brokers need only be able to cover their net short-sale positions every day.57
54 See POLLACK, supra note 41, at 15 (“Technically, a short-sale transaction begins with the decision to 
borrow securities, since the short seller’s broker should have reason to believe he can borrow the stock 
before executing an order.”).
55 See, e.g., Mark Hulbert, Season for Shorting?, FORBES, Oct. 15, 1990, at 231; Ray Brady, Selling Short: 
Not for the Faint of Heart, NATION’S BUS., March 1987, at 63.  
56
 NYSE Rule 431 and NASD Rule 2520 require that a “minimum margin” of $2,000 be deposited into any 
customer’s margin account before margin trading (and short selling) may begin, though brokers may require 
higher deposits.  The NASD recently increased its margin requirement for “day traders” to $25,000.  See 
“Investing with Borrowed Funds: No ‘Margin’ for Error,” available from the NASD website, 
www.nasd.org. 
57 See Janvey, supra note 41, at 273 & n.8 (“The Federal Reserve’s Regulation T specifies the amount of 
money that brokers can lend to their customers for the purchase of securities ‘on margin,’ and it also 
specifies the additional cash ‘margin’ that an investor must deposit or borrow in order to make a short sale.  
The present margin requirement on most short sales is 150 percent, meaning the broker must hold the 
proceeds of the sale (100 percent), and the investor must deposit or borrow an additional 50 percent.  Short 
sales by exchange specialists and market makers, and proprietary short sales by self-clearing brokers, are 
exempt from this requirement.”).  Since market makers and self-clearing brokers will potentially have many 
off-setting orders, they are required only to maintain a net position that would allow them to cover all open 
short sales each day.  See POLLACK, supra note 41, at 16. 
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Once the account is established and a short-sell order is made, the short seller’s 
broker takes over.  It is the broker’s responsibility to execute the short sale by locating 
securities to borrow.58  Brokers can accomplish this by borrowing the securities from 
other customers’ margin accounts, from other brokers, or from institutions that agree to 
lend their securities.59  “Securities lending for this purpose is highly organized, and 
usually the seller’s broker has no problem borrowing the necessary shares, either from 
other customers’ margin accounts or from another broker.”60  If the securities are 
borrowed from another broker or from an institutional lender, the borrowing broker will 
be required to transfer 100% of the value of the borrowed securities in cash to the 
lender.61 This is the lender’s incentive to lend the securities.  “These funds are held in 
interest-bearing assets by the stock lender to increase his rate of return on his investment 
in the underlying security loaned out, or, in the case of a lending broker, to reduce the 
margin funds borrowed from banks.”62  For the securities lender, this provides the use of 
‘free money.’63
At this point, shares have been located for borrowing, margin has been posted 
with the lender, and the short sale is then executed.  This process is transparent in the 
marketplace: the purchaser on the other side of the trade will ordinarily have no 
58 See 12 C.J.S. Brokers § 72 (2003).
59 See POLLACK, supra note 41, at 16.  If the broker borrows securities from another customer’s account, 
there is no requirement to notify the customer.  The reason for this is that when a customer sets up a margin 
account, the customer must agree to allow her securities to be leant by the broker.  See Janvey, supra note 
41, at 275.
60
 Janvey, supra note 41, at 274.  Typically, the actual securities will come from the accounts of broker-
dealers or institutional investors.  See id. at 271-72 & n.5.
61 See POLLACK, supra note 41, at 16.
62 Id.
63 See Stock Strategies: Short Selling, GlobalInvestor.com, available at http:magazine.globalinvestor.com/ 
static/intro/text/school_24.html.
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indication that he is buying securities that are being sold short.64 But the shares will not 
actually be borrowed at this time.  Instead, the shares will be borrowed only when the 
trade settles, which can be up to five business days after execution.  If for some reason the 
short seller’s broker becomes unable to borrow shares at settlement, no shares will be 
delivered to the purchaser and a “fail-to-deliver” will result.65  Fails-to-deliver occur at 
market clearing agencies whenever an executed trade fails to settle, and they appear in the 
account of the selling broker.66  A fail-to-deliver is still a valid trade, it just means that no 
payment will be made by the purchaser (nor received by the short seller) until the seller’s 
broker acquires the securities, delivers them to the purchaser, and settles the trade.67  As 
will be shown in Part IV, fails-to-deliver are an important issue in death spiral litigation.68
The process of short selling also increases beneficial ownership of a security.  
Beneficial ownership is the legal right to own a security and, while a short sale is open—
that is, until it is covered and both the purchaser and the lender receive their shares—
short selling temporarily increases beneficial ownership because both the lender and the 
purchaser have a legal right to the same shares. The lender never loses its right to the 
shares by lending them yet the purchaser acquires a right to the lender’s shares upon 
execution of the short sale. 69  This increased beneficial ownership will occur even if there 
is a fail-to-deliver (because fails-to-deliver are still valid trades) and will exist until the 
short seller covers the short sale.  What is more, short sellers do not need to cover 
64 See LOSS & SELIGMAN, supra note 48, at 699.
65
 Janvey, supra note 41, at 274 n.9.
66 See id.
67 See, e.g., Fail to Deliver, NetExchange Client Investment Glossary, available at
http://www.netxclient.com/universal2/invest_glosry_FFh.htm.
68 See infra text accompany notes 288-98.
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quickly.  (This is an important point for a short seller planning the “death spiral” of a 
company.)  Short sales may remain open for as long as the lending broker allows, and the 
short seller’s only responsibility is to maintain its margin with the lender.  (The reader 
will recall that lenders have an incentive to keep a short open because this provides them 
with the use of the short sellers margin—‘free money.’)70  “A genuine securities short 
seller, who borrowed the security she has delivered, may hold her position as long as she 
is able to meet her margin calls—indefinitely, if she has the financial wherewithal to 
withstand a significant rise in the price of the security.”71
B)  The Law of Short Selling 
     1.  Securities Listed on a National Exchange
As previously indicated, Congress placed its instructions with respect to short 
selling in Section 10(a) of the Securities Exchange Act.72  This gives the SEC authority to 
create rules governing short sales on national securities exchanges, but by its terms 
applies only to the exchanges.73  SEC short-selling rules created under Sec. 10(a) thus 
only govern short sales of securities traded on an exchange registered pursuant to Section
12(b) of the Securities Exchange Act (such as the New York Stock Exchange or 
American Stock Exchange).74
69 See Janvey, supra note 41, at 274.  Of course, the short sale never results in more shares being 
outstanding, nor does it increase the total number of shares in the company, which can only be done by 
amending the company’s articles of incorporation.
70 See supra note 63 and accompanying text.
71
 Richard D. Friedman, Stalking the Squeeze: Understanding Commodities Market Manipulation, 89 
MICH. L. REV. 30, 45 n.36 (1990).
72 See supra notes 52 and accompanying text.
73 See supra notes 53 and accompanying text
74
 The SEC’s short selling rules apply only to securities that are registered on the national exchanges and do 
not apply to over-the-counter securities that have exchange-trading privileges.  See generally Securities 
Exchange Act Release No. 34-22975, 51 F.R. 8801 (March 14, 1986).  See also, Janvey, supra note 41, at 
278.
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There are three basic SEC short selling rules.75  First, Rule 3b-3 defines the term 
“short sale”: “‘short sale’ means any sale of a security which the seller does not own or 
any sale which is consummated by the delivery of a security borrowed by, or for the 
account of, the seller.”76  This definition parallels the working definition and description 
of short selling outlined by this paper above.77  The second SEC rule is Rule 10a-1,78
which provides the SEC’s substantive regulation of short sales.  First adopted in 1938, 
Rule 10a-1 contains the SEC’s “tick test.”79
The tick test is a pricing rule that was designed to prevent short selling from 
depressing the market values of securities.  The SEC adopted the tick to achieve three 
objectives:  (1) to allow unrestricted short selling in an advancing market; (2) to prevent 
short selling at successively lower prices, thereby limiting the ability of short sellers to 
drive-down stock prices; and (3) to prevent short sellers from accelerating a declining 
market by exhausting all remaining bids at one price.80  Rule 10a-1 does this by 
prohibiting short sales at or below the last market price for the security, unless this price 
is above the next preceding market price.  This is a complicated standard and is best 
understood through an example.  Say, for instance, that market sales occur at $49.85 and 
then $50.  The tick test would then allow for an infinite number of short sales at $50 
(because this is above the last market sale price, which was in turn above the next 
75 See LOSS & SELIGMAN, supra note 49, at 3203.  There are also thirteen exceptions to these SEC rules that 
allow for short selling activity the SEC deems to be beneficial, but these exceptions are not important to the 
analysis in this paper.  See generally Janvey, supra note 41, at 278-79. 
76
 17 C.F.R. § 240.3b-3 (2004). 
77
 See supra note 42 and accompanying text.  Cf. Worley, supra note 53, at 1257 (discussing the definition 
of “short sale”). 
78
 17 C.F.R. § 240.10a-1 (2004).
79 See SEC Proposed Regulation SHO, supra note 47, at 62978.
80 See Notice of Adoption of Amendments to Rules 10a-1 and 10a-2, Securities Exchange Act Release No. 
34-11468, June 12, 1975.
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preceding sale price). But if the two sales were $49.85 and $49.80, the tick test would 
prevent any short sales below $49.85 (because the last market sale price was below its 
next preceding sale price).”81  The tick test thus necessarily requires real-time monitoring 
of pricing data to evaluate acceptable and unacceptable short-sale trades.82
The third SEC short-selling rule is a delivery rule, Rule 10a-2,83 but it is not 
germane to the analysis in this paper.84  Instead, a more important delivery rule for 
purposes of this paper is the New York Stock Exchange’s delivery rule.  NYSE Rule 
440C.10 mandates that all brokers executing short sales on the exchange must locate 
stock available for borrowing prior to executing the trade.85  This rule therefore should 
prevent intentional fails-to-deliver (also known as “naked short selling,” discussed in 
detail below).86
     2.  Securities Traded in the Over-the-Counter Market
Short selling regulation in the over-the-counter (“OTC”) market is unrelated to 
short selling regulation on national securities exchanges.  The reason for this is that the 
SEC’s Section 10(a) authority does not extend to the OTC markets.87  “Although the 
81 See LOSS & SELIGMAN, supra note 49, at 3203-04.
82
 The operation of the tick test can become quite complicated.  For a more detailed examination of how 
Rule 10a-1 operates, see Worley, supra note 53, at 1259-62.
83
 17 C.F.R. § 240.10a-2 (2004).
84
 Rule 10a-2 prohibits brokers or dealers from, among other things, lending securities to effect a sale that is 
marked long under Rule 10a-1.  For a discussion of Rule 10a-2, see Worley, supra note 53, at 1264-65.
85 See, e.g., SEC Proposed Regulation SHO, supra note 47, at 62976.
86
 For a discussion of naked short selling, see infra Part II.B.3.
87 See supra note 53.  The SEC evidently could adopt short selling rules for the OTC markets based on 
other powers afforded to it by the securities laws, however it has not done so.  See Worley, supra note 53, at 
1275 n.75 (“Moreover, it appears that the SEC does not have authority under the Exchange Act section 
10(a) to regulate the short selling of purely OTC stocks since section 10(a) refers to short sales effected in 
securities registered on an exchange.  Nevertheless, the SEC presumably would have such authority under 
section 15(c)(1) or (2), 15 U.S.C.A. 78o, which, unlike section 10(b), 15 U.S.C.A. 78j, grant[s] to the SEC 
the authority to define the terms ‘manipulative,’ ‘deceptive,’ and ‘fraudulent.’  While sections 15(c)(1) and 
(2) only apply to transactions effected by broker-dealers, the SEC could prohibit them from effecting 
transactions for others in contravention of an OTC short sale rule.”). 
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Commission has regulated short sales since 1938, that regulation has been limited to short 
sales of exchange-listed securities.”88  Thus, none of the aforementioned SEC rules apply 
to the following discussion.  
There are four distinct markets that make up the over-the-counter stockmarket.
The principle market is the Nasdaq National Market (“NNM”).89  This is the over-the-
counter listing for major industrial companies, and is distinct from the Nasdaq SmallCap 
Market, which lists smaller companies.90  There are two other OTC markets as well, the 
Nasdaq Over-the-Counter Bulletin Board (“OTCBB”) and the Pink Sheets.91  Short 
selling regulation of these four over-the-counter markets is bifurcated into two basic 
regimes: the rules for Nasdaq National Market and the rules for the three other three.
88 See, e.g., Self-Regulatory Organizations, Securities Exchange Act Release No. 34-48967, 68 F.R. 75299, 
Dec. 30, 2003, available at 2003 WL 23021289.  The SEC has been reviewing the issue of short-selling 
regulations of OTC securities for many years.  Since the SEC does not have explicit authority to draft an 
OTC short-selling rule under Sec. 10(a) it would have to do so indirectly.  In 1974, as part of changes in the 
securities markets ordered by Congress, the SEC changed Rule 10a-1 to make it applicable to all securities 
listed on the new “Consolidated Tape” in the nascent national market system.  This would ostensibly 
include OTC securities reported as part of the Consolidated Tape, however the SEC ‘temporarily’ exempted 
OTC securities from the short-sale rule until the NASD could confirm that the OTC market was ready for it. 
See Notice of Adoption of Amendments to Rules 10a-1 and 10a-2 Under the Securities Exchange Act of 
1934, Securities Exchange Act Release No. 34-11468, June 12, 1975, available at 1975 WL 162899.  This 
never happened.  Then, in 1985, the SEC issued additional Releases potentially broadening the scope of 
Rule 10a-1 further in covering OTC securities.  Again, however, OTC securities escaped SEC regulation.  
In March 1986, the SEC adopted a permanent amendment exempting transactions in OTC stocks from the 
short sale rule.  See Worley, supra note 53, at 1274-75.  
89 See, e.g., www.nasdaq.com.  
90
 The listing standards for the NNM and SmallCap markets are based on a complex of factors, but, 
basically, Nasdaq National Market companies will have market capitalizations of over $50 million while 
SmallCap companies will have capitalizations below $50 million.  See Nasdaq Stock Market, Listing 
Requirements and Fees, available at http://www.nasdaq.com/about/nasdaq_listing_req_fees.pdf.  In terms 
of the numbers of companies in each market, there are currently about 2,600 NNM stocks and only about 
680 SmallCap stocks.  See Nasdaq Market Classification, available at http://www.nasdaqnews.com/ 
MarketData/News_mrktdata_home.htm. 
91
 There are many thousands of OTCBB and Pink Sheet companies, which are very small, largely 
unregulated issuers.  See, e.g., Gregory Zuckerman, Heard on the Street: OTC Trading Surges as 
Speculation Makes a Comeback, WALL ST. J., Oct. 10, 2003, at C1 (indicating that there are approximately 
3,400 OTCBB stocks); Jeff D. Opdyke, More Blue Chips Hit the Pink Sheets, WALL ST. J.,  Jan. 21, 2003, 
at D1 (indicating that there are approximately 3,300 Pink Sheet stocks).
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a. Short Selling in the Nasdaq National Market92
Since the SEC’s Section 10(a) authority does not extend to the OTC markets,93 it 
took rulemaking from the National Association of Securities Dealers to provide short 
selling regulation for the Nasdaq National Market.  This occurred ten years ago.94 In 
1994, the SEC approved NASD Rule 3350, which has much the same function as Rule 
10a-1 but which is applicable to the Nasdaq National Market.95  Rule 3350 is similar to 
the SEC’s tick test in that it prevents short sales from exerting downward pricing pressure 
on a security.  It does this by requiring that all short sales in the NNM be at or above the 
recent market “inside bid” (i.e., the highest current bid price in the market).96  Rule 3350 
is reinforced by another NASD rule, Rule 3370.  Rule 3370 is a delivery rule and instructs 
that no NASD member shall execute a short sale unless the member makes an 
“affirmative determination” that the member will receive the security from the customer 
or can borrow the security on behalf of the customer.97  Rule 3370 thus parallels NYSE 
Rule 440C.10 in the attempt to prevent intentional fails-to-deliver.98  Finally, NASD Rule 
92
 The Nasdaq recently applied to the SEC to become a regulated securities “exchange.”  See The Nasdaq 
Stock Market, Inc.; Notice of Filing of Application for Registration as a National Securities Exchange 
Under Section 6 of the Exchange Act, Securities Exchange Act Release No. 34-44396, June 7, 2001, 
available at 2001 WL 629346.  If this occurs, then of course the regulation of NNM securities will become 
subject to the SEC’s exchange rules just like all exchange-traded securities.  See SEC Proposed Regulation 
SHO, supra note 47, at 62979.
93 See supra notes 53 and 87.
94 See Self-Regulatory Organizations, Securities Exchange Act Release no. 34-34277, June 29, 1994, 
available at 1994 WL 317379.  Rule 3350 was originally issued on a temporary basis, but has been re-
authorized multiple times and thus has been continuously operative to the present.  See Self-Regulatory 
Organization Notice, Securities Exchange Act Release No. 34-48967 (Dec. 30, 2003). 
95 See Self-Regulatory Organization Notice, Securities Exchange Act Release No. 34-48967 (Dec. 30, 
2003).
96 See id. 
97 See Rule 3370, available through the NASD Manual Online at: http://cchwallstreet.com/nasd.
98 See supra notes 85-86 and accompanying text. 
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11830 addresses the problem of fails-to-deliver by preventing short sales of securities for
which significant fails-to-deliver have built up at a market clearing agency.99
The regulatory regimes for exchange-traded securities and Nasdaq National 
Market securities are thus similar in design.  Both employ a price-maintenance rule, and 
both have broker delivery requirements.  But as will be seen below, the short selling 
regime for SmallCap, OTCBB, and Pink Sheets stocks is different in one critical respect: 
it lacks a pricing rule such as the tick test or bid test.  This is a significant difference, and 
impacts death spiral litigation.
b. Short-Selling in the Nasdaq SmallCap Market, Over-the-Counter Bulletin 
Board, and Pink Sheets 
In contrast to the regulated exchanges and, more recently, the NNM, the SmallCap 
Market, Over-the-Counter Bulletin Board and Pink Sheets are not subject to any short-
sale pricing rule.100  Rule 10a-1 does not apply because these are OTC markets, NASD 
Rule 3350 does not apply because it is limited to the Nasdaq National Market,101 and 
there are no substitutes.  Thus, the companies in these three OTC markets (which are, of 
course, all small issuers) lack the single most important form of short selling regulation, a 
pricing rule.  Given the SEC’s three rationales for the pricing rules,102 it appears clear that 
small companies need and deserve these protections at least as much as larger, more 
seasoned issuers.  Yet the small OTC markets receive no help from regulators.  These 
three markets are subject to other NASD rules such as the delivery requirements listed 
99 See SEC Proposed Regulation SHO, supra note 47, at 62977.  NASD Rule 11830 restricts short sales 
where over 10,000 fails to deliver have accumulated and this is at least 1/2% of the issuer’s total shares 
outstanding.
100 See, e.g., LOSS & SELIGMAN, supra note 49, at 3215; SEC Proposed Regulation SHO, supra note 47, at 
62972.
101 See NASD Rule 3350, available at http://cchwallstreet.com/nasd.
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above,103 however this provides only incidental short selling regulation and is far less 
protective of price manipulation than Rule 10a-1 or Rule 3350.    
     3.  Naked Short Selling  
A final short selling issue that appears in the context of death-spiral litigation is 
the topic of “naked short selling.”  Naked short selling is the practice of short-selling a 
security without borrowing the shares necessary to make delivery to the purchaser.  A 
naked short will thus result in a fail-to-deliver securities to the purchaser.104  Although 
intentional naked short selling implicitly violates a selling broker’s locate-and-delivery 
obligations under rules such as NYSE Rule 440C.10 and NASD Rule 3370 (see above), 
naked short selling is not per se illegal.105  The reason for this is that securities are not 
always available for borrowing, even when a broker reasonably expects them to be, and 
thus a certain amount of naked short selling is virtually inevitable.  
When brokers arrange a short sale, they do not actually target specific shares held 
in a specific account that will be used to settle the short.  Instead, brokers execute short 
sales in reliance upon lists that identify how easy securities are to borrow.106  Short sale 
positions are then netted against each other each day in a complex clearing system.107  It
is thus entirely possible that a broker may perform her duty and reasonably believe that 
she has located securities for the short sale, only to find that, on the settlement date, no 
102 See supra text accompanying note 80. 
103 See NASD Rule 3370, 11380, available at http://cchwallstreet.com/nasd.  
104 See SEC Proposed Regulation SHO, supra note 47, at 62974 (“Naked short selling is selling short 
without borrowing the necessary securities to make delivery, thus potentially resulting in a ‘fail to deliver’ 
securities to the buyer.”).  This paper has previously discussed fails-to-deliver, see supra text accompanying 
notes 64-67.
105 See Worley, supra note 53, at 1282 (“Naked short selling by NASD-member broker-dealers that are 
registered with the SEC is not in and of itself illegal.”).
106 See SEC Proposed Regulation SHO, supra note 47, at 62976.
107 See Worley, supra note 53, at 1278.
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securities are available for delivery.  If this occurs, the seller and purchaser on either side 
of the as-yet-uncompleted short sale then may desire to keep the short sale open rather 
than cancel the short or clear it through other means.108  And there is ordinarily no limit 
on how long the short may remain unsettled.109  Thus, naked shorts may linger and 
accumulate at the securities clearing agencies.110
It is unclear when, if at all, naked short selling is unlawful,111 and this paper can 
find no court case that definitively addresses this point.112  The SEC’s position is also 
unclear.  In 2003, the SEC reaffirmed a prior Exchange Act Release on naked short 
selling from 1962,113 but the exact contours of the Commission’s views are muddy.  For 
instance, the recent SEC Release states: “The Commission issued a prior statement 
cautioning broker-dealers that where the broker-dealer has sold short, but did not, for a 
substantial period of time, effect the offsetting purchase transactions for purpose of 
delivery, this could generally involve violations of the anti-fraud provisions of the Federal 
108
 For instance, the seller may not want to settle the trade by borrowing from a different lender (assuming 
securities can be located) as this may have to be done at higher cost.  Nor would the seller choose to settle 
the short by purchasing securities in the open market, as this would cancel-out the short position.  Similarly, 
the purchaser (who is awaiting delivery on the short sale) may not want to cancel the lawful trade nor 
demand delivery, because a demand would force the purchaser to conduct a buy-in, which has costs for the 
purchaser.  See Worley, supra note 53, at 1279.
109 See Worley, supra note 53, at 1278 (“Unless the purchaser or its clearing broker-dealer demands 
delivery of the stock, it may be carried as a fail-to-deliver until the seller decides to purchase or borrow the 
stock for delivery to complete the short.”).
110
 SEC Proposed Regulation SHO, supra note 47, at 62975.
111 Compare 2 THOMAS LEE HAZEN, LAW OF SECURITIES REGULATION § 14.22 (4th ed. 2004) (“Uncovered, 
or ‘naked,’ short sales are manipulative and hence in violation of the 1934 Act.), with Worley, supra note 
53, at 1282 (“Naked short selling by NASD-member broker-dealers that are registered with the SEC is not 
in and of itself illegal.).  
112 See generally Sullivan & Long, Inc. v. Scattered Corp., 47 F.3d 857 (7th Cir. 1995) (implying that a 
market maker’s intentional naked short selling that did not violate exchange rules is not unlawful); In re 
Olympia Brewing Co. Lit., 613 F. Supp. 1286, 1295 (N.D. Ill. 1985) (dismissing naked short selling 
allegation for want of evidence without evaluating the underlying legal issue).
113 See SEC Proposed Regulation SHO, supra note 47, at 62975 n.29.
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securities laws.”114  This shows that the SEC considers naked short selling to be 
potentially fraudulent, but provides no useful guidance as to the boundaries of the 
illegality.  For example, it does not instruct what level of scienter is required and whether 
persons other than brokers can engage in fraudulent naked short selling.  The one-page 
1962 Release is similarly unhelpful.115
Part III – Review Of Six FPS Actions:
Facts and Claims Alleged & A Few Court Decisions
This paper will now review six Future Priced Securities cases to begin the analysis 
of death spiral litigation.  Five of these cases are from the Southern District of New York 
and are discussed in subparagraph “A” below.116  The sixth case, GFL v. Colkitt, is a case 
out of Pennsylvania and will be examined separately in subparagraph “B.”  GFL reached 
a final judgment before the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit and, as 
will be demonstrated, has important precedential value for other FPS litigation.117
The purpose of this review is to identify the common facts and claims alleged in 
these cases as well as the legal conclusions that may be drawn from them.  As indicated at 
the outset of this paper, these cases raise a variety of claims, including federal and state 
securities violations, civil violations of the Racketeering and Corrupt Organizations Act 
(“RICO”), and common law tort, breach of contract, and breach of fiduciary duty 
114 See SEC Proposed Regulation SHO, supra note 47, at 62975 n.29, citing Short Sales of Securities, 
Securities Exchange Act Release No. 34-6778, April 16, 1962.
115 See Short Sales of Securities, Securities Exchange Act Release No. 34-6778, April 16, 1962, available 
at 1962 WL 69297. 
116 See infra notes 120-24. 
117 See infra Part III.B.
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claims.118  Yet this paper reviews only the federal securities fraud claims filed under 
Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act.  
A)  Five Future-Priced Securities Cases from the Southern District of New York
To investigate the topic of Future Priced Securities litigation, this paper examines 
five specific complaints that have been filed in the Southern District of New York in 
recent years.  This paper reviews these complaints like a court evaluating a motion to 
dismiss—i.e., this paper assumes as true all allegations in the complaints and considers 
publicly available information, such as the securities filings from these companies 
available from the Securities and Exchange Commission’s EDGAR database system.119
1. The Issuers and Their Future Priced Securities 
The following table identifies these five cases, by plaintiff and defendant.  In each 
case, of course, the plaintiffs were issuers of Future Priced Securities suing the purchasers 
of their securities.  The table also identifies the markets in which the issuers’ securities 
were traded, which, as indicated above, determines the level of short selling regulation 
involved.
118 See infra Part III.A.2. 
119
 The SEC’s EDGAR database may be accessed at: www.sec.gov/edgar/searchedgar/companysearch.html. 
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Plaintiff (FPF Issuer) Defendant (FPS Purchaser) Market
Internet Law Library, Inc. Southridge Capital Mgmt., et al. OTCBB120
Log On America, Inc. Promethean Asset Mgmt., et al. NNM121
Nanopierce Technologies, Inc. Southridge Capital Mgmt., et al. OTCBB122
Sedona, Corp. Ladenburg Thalmann, et. al. SmallCap123
JAG Media Holdings, Inc. A.G. Edwards & Sons, Inc., et al. OTCBB124
This table shows that four of the five companies traded in the less regulated over-the-
counter markets, so their securities were not protected by the SEC’s or NASD’s short sale 
pricing rules.125  Furthermore, because these issuers were small companies, it is 
reasonable to conclude that their stocks were thinly traded—i.e., the companies had low 
average daily trading volume—and that the companies were not widely followed by 
securities analysts.126
120 See Internet Law Library, Inc. v. Southridge Capital Mgmt. LLC, et al., No. 01-CV-06600 (S.D.N.Y.), 
Plaintiff’s Original Complaint and Request for Injunction, filed July 20, 2001, ¶ 12 [hereinafter Internet 
Law Library Complaint].  
121 I.e., Log On America traded in the Nasdaq National Market.  See Log On America, Inc. v. Promethean 
Asset Mgmt. LLC, et al., No. 00-CV-6218 (S.D.N.Y.), Complaint and Jury Demand, filed Aug. 18, 2000, ¶ 
1.  (Note: there was a subsequent Amended Complaint filed in the Log On America action, however the 
author was unable to obtain it from the Southern District of New York Clerk of the Court’s office.)
122 See Nanopierce Tech. Inc. v. Southridge Capital Mgmt. LLC, et al., No. 02-CV-0767 (S.D.N.Y.), First 
Amended Complaint, filed June 24, 2002,  ¶ 1 [hereinafter Nanopierce Complaint].
123 I.e., Sedona traded in the Nasdaq SmallCap market prior to issuing its Future Priced Security.  See
Sedona Corp. v. Ladenburg Thalmann, et al., No. 03-CV-3120 (S.D.N.Y.), First Amended Complaint and 
Jury Demand, filed July 18, 2003, ¶ 102 [hereinafter Sedona Complaint].
124 See JAG Media Holdings, Inc. v. A.G. Edwards & Sons, Inc. et al., No. 02-CV-2867 (S.D. Tex.), 
Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint and Jury Demand, filed Nov. 22, 2002 [hereinafter JAG Media 
Holdings Complaint]. See JagNotes.com Securities Purchase Agreement, dated June 12, 2000, Sec. 3(e), 
available at: http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1089029/000088981200002829/0000889812-00-
002829-0003.txt. 
125 See supra text accompanying notes 100-03.
126
 These facts are relevant for the Analysis section.  Specifically, the complaints indicate that Internet Law 
Library’s market capitalization prior to its FPS offering was approximately $200 million (see Internet Law 
Library Complaint, supra note 120, ¶ 23), Log On America’s was approximately $140 million (see Log On 
America Complaint, supra note 121, ¶ 2), and Sedona’s was approximately $280 million (see Sedona 
Complaint, supra note 123, ¶ 66).  The Nanopierce and JAG Media Holdings complaints do not provide 
such information.  Also, based on a review of financial websites, none of these five companies is currently 
being followed by a securities analyst, though the author was unable to determine whether these companies 
were followed by analysts when they issued their Future Priced Securities.  However, this appears unlikely 
based on their small market capitalization, poor finances, and limited market power. 
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There are other common themes among these companies as well.  These issuers 
were all small technology companies, desperate for cash when they issued their Future 
Priced Securities.  Internet Law Library’s business was offering legal research services 
over the internet, and it operated at a loss, had negative cash flows, and warned investors 
that it might never achieve profitability.127  It therefore sought a $28 million FPS to keep 
its business going.128  Log On America was another internet company and was similarly 
cash-poor: “We have incurred net losses since our inception and anticipate continuing 
losses.”129  By comparison, Nanopierce Technologies’ held a series of patents that it 
hoped to commercialize, but it knew these might never become marketable.130  Sedona 
sold business software and claimed to have a solid business plan based on, among other 
things, a strategic partnership with IBM Corp.  Nevertheless, it too operated at a loss131
and agreed to a $50 million FPS to finance planned growth.132  Finally, JAG Media 
Holdings (known prior to issuing its FPS as “JagNotes.com”) issued a $10 million FPS to 
finance a financial television program related to its internet financial advisory business.133
127 See Internet Law Library Form S-1, filed Dec. 22, 2000, (“We expect net losses and negative cash flows 
to continue for the foreseeable future as we continue to incur significant operating expenses and make 
capital investments in our business.  We may never generate sufficient revenues to achieve profitability.”), 
available at http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/3959/000093066100003254/0000930661-00-003254-
0001.txt
128 See Internet Law Library Complaint, supra note 120, ¶ 130.
129 See, e.g., Log On America Form S-3, filed May 23, 2000, Risk Factors, available at http://www.sec.gov/ 
Archives/edgar/data/1074927/0000889812-00-002465-index.html. 
130 See Nanopierce Technologies Form S-3/A, filed May 23, 2000, Prospectus & Risk Factors, available at
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/827161/0000927356-00-001187-index.html. 
131 See Sedona 1999 Form 10-K, filed May 30, 2000, Consolidated Statement of Cash Flows, available at
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/764843/0000950116-00-000719-index.html. 
132 See Sedona Complaint, supra note 123, ¶¶ 44 & 56.
133 See JAG Media Holdings Complaint, supra note 124, ¶¶ 160 & 162. 
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 It may be assumed that the company hoped this investment would mitigate its otherwise 
large operating losses.134
In addition to the issuers being small and financially weak, their Future Priced 
Securities generally shared the characteristics of this paper’s “classic case” FPS discussed 
earlier.135  The following is not an exhaustive analysis, but provides some examples to 
demonstrate these points.  As a threshold matter, it is important to note that these 
companies did not need to seek shareholder approval prior to issuing their Future Priced 
Securities.  For example, Internet Law Library had 100 million shares authorized under its 
articles of incorporation but only 35 million outstanding at the time of its FPS, so its 
directors were well within their authority to issue an FPS capped at 30.7 million shares.136
The directors of Sedona had similar authority to issue that company’s future-priced 
convertible preferred stock due to a large number of authorized but un-issued shares.137
These five FPS deals parallel this paper’s “classic case” FPS.  First, of course, 
they provide an opportunity for profit.  These companies did not pay dividends or interest 
on their FPS’s (since they all have limited—negative—cash flows), but instead 
compensated investors with conversion discounts.138  Internet Law Library’s conversion 
discount, for instance, was a minimum of 20%.  Thus, its investors had a reasonable 
134 See JagNotes.com Form 10-QSB, filed March 16, 2000, Condensed Consolidated Statement of Cash 
Flows, available at http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1089029/0000889812-00-001211-index.html. 
135
 The reader will recall that this paper’s “classic case” FPS is convertible security, stock or bond, that is 
convertible into a fixed amount of the issuer’s stock, at a conversion discount of 15%.  Furthermore, the 
classic case FPS caps the number of shares the stock can be converted into and contains conversion 
windows.  Finally, there are no short selling restrictions in the classic case FPS.  See supra text 
accompanying notes 18-24. 
136 See Internet Law Library Form S-1, filed Dec. 22, 2000, Prospectus & Plan of Distribution, available at
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/3959/000093066100003254/0000930661-00-003254-0001.txt. 
137 See, e.g., Sedona Form S-3, filed June 26, 2000, Description of Preferred Stock, available at
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/764843/000095011600001517/0000950116-00-001517-0001.txt.
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expectation of at least a 20% return.139  The other companies provided similar benefits, 
though the details of their conversion discounts are unclear.  (For example, the 
Nanopierce and Log On America complaints both state that the purchasers of their FPS’s 
were entitled to conversion discounts, however the complaints do not identify how much 
each discount would be.)140
The purchasers of the Future Priced Securities also made representations and 
warranties, both oral and written, in connection with their FPS purchases.  In three of 
these offerings the purchasers allegedly made representations about their “investment 
intent” with respect to the FPS offerings.141  These representations were made either in 
writing via the securities purchase agreement142 or orally during negotiations, or both.143
Furthermore, the purchasers made representations about their abilities and willingness to 
finance the FPS deals as well as about their prior business and investment practices.144
(The issuers thus sought to know ‘what sort of investors they were dealing with.’)  Most 
importantly, though, only two of the five offerings restricted short selling by the FPS 
purchasers: Internet Law Library145 and Sedona146 prohibited short selling through their 
138 See, e.g., Sedona Form S-3, filed June 26, 2000, Dividend Policy, available at http://www.sec.gov/ 
Archives/edgar/data/764843/000095011600001517/0000950116-00-001517-0001.txt. 
139 See Internet Law Library Form S-1, supra note 136, at 24.  The conversion is variable, but is at least a 
20% discount.
140 See Nanopierce Complaint, supra note 122, ¶ 17; Log On America Complaint, supra note 121, ¶ 19.  
The complaints do not state what the conversion discount was and the author unable to calculate these 
himself because of the extreme complexity of the conversion calculations.  
141
 The three are Log On America, Internet Law Library, and Sedona.  See Log On America Complaint, 
supra note 121, ¶ 30; Internet Law Library Complaint, supra note 120, ¶ 14; Sedona Complaint, supra note 
123, ¶ 54.  
142 See Log On America Complaint, supra note 121, ¶ 30.
143 See Internet Law Library Complaint, supra note 120, ¶ 14.
144 See Log On America Complaint, supra note 121, ¶ 56; Internet Law Library Complaint, supra note 120, 
¶ 14; Nanopierce Complaint, supra note 122, ¶ 34; Sedona Complaint, supra note 123, ¶ 50.
145 See Internet Law Library Complaint, supra note 120, ¶ 14c; Internet Law Library Securities Purchase 
Agreement, filed Dec. 22, 2000, Sec. 5.12 Certain Trading Restrictions, available at http://www.sec.gov/ 
Archives/edgar/data/3959/000093066100003254/0000930661-00-003254-0003.txt. 
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securities purchase agreements, while the Nanopierce147 and JAG Media Holdings148 FPS 
offerings permitted short selling without restriction.  The Log On America offering took a 
middle route and prevented uncovered (i.e., naked) short selling.149
Finally, these companies share one other unfortunate similarity: their stock prices 
fell dramatically in the months after issuing their FPS’s.  Internet Law Library’s shares 
fell from $7/share to $0.12/share in the ten months after its FPS offering.150  Log On 
America’s stock similarly fell from $17/share to $2.50/share in less than six months,151
while Nanopierce’s stock fell by 60% within just three months.152
2. Legal Claims Alleged Against the FPS Purchasers 
In these five cases, the FPS issuers alleged many causes of action against the 
purchasers.  Some of these claims are common to all the complaints, while others are 
raised in only case.  In aggregate, though, the issuers allege violations of federal and state 
securities laws, violations of the Racketeering Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act 
(“RICO”), and violations of common law.  But because the purpose of this paper is to 
analyze only the federal securities fraud claims, this paper will not examine the RICO, 
state securities law, breach of contract, tort, and breach of fiduciary duty claims.  Instead, 
this paper focuses only on the federal securities fraud claims filed under Section 10(b) of 
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (“Exchange Act”) and Rule 10b-5 promulgated 
thereunder.  (Thus, this paper ignores the following Exchange Act claims filed in these 
146 See Sedona Complaint, supra note 123, ¶ 62. 
147 See Nanopierce Purchase Agreement, dated Oct. 20, 2000, available at http://www.sec.gov/Archives/ 
edgar/data/827161/000092735600001950/0000927356-00-001950-0006.txt
148 See JAG Media Holdings Securities Purchase Agreement, available at http://www.sec.gov/Archives/ 
edgar/data/1089029/000088981200002829/0000889812-00-002829-0003.txt. 
149 See Log On America Complaint, supra note 121, ¶ 32 & Exhibit A-Securities Purchase Agreement, ¶ 4n.
150 See Internet Law Library Complaint, supra note 120, ¶ 22.
151 See Log On America Complaint, supra note 121, ¶ 2.
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actions: market manipulation in violation of Section 9;153 Section 13 and 16(a) reporting 
violations; violations of the Section 16(b) short-swing trading restrictions; and Section 
20(a) control-person liability.)154
a. Misrepresentation Claims 
The first federal securities fraud claim common to all the complaints is 
misrepresentation in violation of Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5.155  These are fact 
dependent allegations and so will not be exhaustively retold here.  However, the 
following provides a brief overview of some of these allegations. 
Internet Law Library alleged fraud based on alleged oral misrepresentations by the 
purchasers of its FPS, Southridge Capital et al.  Internet Law Library’s claim is thus a 
form of fraud-in-the-inducement: the company alleges that, but for the purchasers’ oral 
misrepresentations during preliminary negotiations, the company never would have 
issued the FPS to these investors.  Specifically, the company alleges the following 
misrepresentations: (1) that the purchasers intended and would be able to provide $28 
million in financing for the FPS; (2) that they would not short sell for one year (later 
152 See Nanopierce Complaint, supra note 122, ¶ 11.
153
 Two complaints raise claims of market manipulation in violation of Sec. 9 of the Exchange Act, 15 
U.S.C. § 78i.  See JAG Media Holdings Complaint, supra note 124, ¶ 188; Internet Law Library Complaint, 
supra note 120, ¶ 28.  These claims are clearly not actionable, however, because these companies trade on 
the over-the-counter market while Sec. 9 only applies to exchange-traded securities.  See LOSS & 
SELIGMAN, supra note 48, at 943 (“In contrast to the relatively elaborate structure of § 9 that Congress 
erected to deal with manipulation of the market for securities registered on exchanges, the only statutory 
bases for dealing with the manipulation of unregistered securities are the general antifraud provisions of the 
1934 Act….”).  As with the short selling regulations discussed earlier, this then illustrates another area in 
which small companies traded in the over-the-counter market (i.e., FPS issuers) receive less protection 
under the federal securities laws than do large, exchange-traded companies (i.e., companies that would 
never consider issuing an FPS). 
154 See generally Internet Law Library Complaint, supra note 120; Log On America Complaint, supra note 
121; Nanopierce Complaint, supra note 122; Sedona Complaint, supra note 123; and JAG Media Holdings 
Complaint, supra note 124.
- 32 -
reduced to six months) or otherwise manipulate the price of the company’s stock; (3) that 
the purchasers had long-term investment interest in the company and were not purchasing 
for resale; (4) that the purchasers had engaged in other FPS deals and created value for 
those companies; and (5) that the purchasers were not the subject of lawsuits.156
Nanopierce Technologies alleged a similar cause of action—i.e., that but for 
purchasers’ misrepresentations, the company never would have issued its FPS.  Unlike 
the Internet Law Library complaint, however, Nanopierce based its allegations on the 
purchasers’ omissions of material information.157  Specifically, Nanopierce labeled as 
material omissions the purchasers’ failure to disclose: (1) their intention to manipulate 
Nanopierce stock; (2) their intention to providing the full amount of financing; (3) their 
intention to "attempt to take control over Nanopierce"; (4) their "pattern and practice" of 
manipulating the stock of other companies; (5) an adverse jury verdict in another FPS 
case; and (6) testimony by the purchasers in other court actions that they tend to liquidate 
their stock positions in FPS deals.158
b. Market Manipulation Claims 
The second set of Section 10(b) claims common to all the death spiral complaints 
are allegations that purchasers violated Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 through “market 
155 See Internet Law Library Complaint, supra note 120, ¶¶ 29-30; Log On America Complaint, supra note 
121, ¶¶ 63-72; Nanopierce Complaint, supra note 122, ¶¶ 58-64; Sedona Complaint, supra note 123, ¶¶ 
107-113; JAG Media Holdings Complaint, supra note 124, ¶¶ 189-190.
156 See Internet Law Library, Inc. v. Southridge Cap. Mgmt., LLC, et al., 223 F. Supp. 2d 474, 478 
(S.D.N.Y. 2002); see also Internet Law Library Complaint, supra note 120, ¶ 14.
157 See Nanopierce Complaint, supra note 122, ¶¶ 32 & 34.
158 See Nanopierce Tech., Inc. v. Southridge Cap. Mgmt., LLC, et al., 2002 WL 31819207 (S.D.N.Y. 
2002), at 3; see also Nanopierce Complaint, supra note 122, ¶¶ 32 & 34.
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manipulation.”159  Market manipulation is a legal term of art but implies that a defendant 
has engaged in a scheme to control or artificially affect the price of a security.160  Here, 
FPS issuers allege that their FPS purchasers engaged in such market manipulation by 
improperly short selling the issuers’ equity securities, thereby causing the “death spirals.” 
The Log On America complaint provides an example of this argument.  Log On 
America claimed that Promethean et al. caused a classic death spiral for the company —
that, notwithstanding limitations on the amount of short selling allowed under the 
Securities Purchase Agreement, the defendants engaged in “massive” short selling to 
depress the price of Log On America’s stock.161  This short selling activity therefore 
allegedly lays bare the purchasers’ alleged misrepresentations that they had “investment 
purposes” in buying the FPS.162  Furthermore, Log On America alleged that the 
defendants “painted the tape” (created the illusion of market activity through pre-arranged 
trades in the company’s stock), engaged in wash sales (rigged sales), and intentional 
naked short selling as part of their effort to deflate the value of Log On America’s 
stock.163  The effect of this manipulative scheme, the company claimed, was to enrich the 
purchasers at the expense of the company.164
[T]he Defendants have guaranteed themselves completely risk-free profits 
and effective control of [Log On America] by structuring and 
implementing this scheme ….  By having forced the price of [Log On 
159 See Internet Law Library Complaint, supra note 120, ¶¶ 29-30; Log On America Complaint, supra note 
121, ¶¶ 63-72; Nanopierce Complaint, supra note 122, ¶¶ 65-69; Sedona Complaint, supra note 123, ¶¶ 
114-118; JAG Media Holdings Complaint, supra note 124, ¶¶ 189-190
160 See Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 199 (1976).  Market manipulation is explained in more 
detail in Part IV.B.  There is a specific section of the securities laws prohibiting market manipulation, 
Section 9 of the Securities Exchange Act, however this only applies to securities traded on an exchange and 
so is inapplicable to the companies in this study.  See supra note 153.
161
 Log On America Complaint, supra note 121, ¶ 32.
162 Id. ¶ 32.
163 Id. ¶ 36.
164 Id. ¶ 38.
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America] common stock from over $17 per share in February 2000 to 
$2.50 per shares in August 2000 through their short sales, Defendants not 
only assured themselves of millions of dollars in profit (i.e. for every share 
shorted at $17 and covered with stock artificially reduced to below $2 per 
share, Defendants made $15), but effective control of [Log On America]
and its valuable assets.165
Other of the death spiral complaints examined herein make similar arguments.  
For instance, JAG Media Holdings, Internet Law Library, and Sedona all allege similar 
market manipulation schemes.  First, JAG Media Holdings alleges a wide conspiracy by 
purchasers, brokers, and market makers, to manipulate its stock through massive naked 
short selling.166 Although by the terms of JAG’s securities purchase agreement the FPS 
purchasers were not prevented from short selling,167 JAG alleges that the defendants’ 
naked short sales created large fails-to-deliver in the market clearing system and that this 
amounts to actionable market manipulation.168  This is a unique legal theory as-yet 
untested in a court of law.169 Second, Sedona filed suit against twenty-seven named 
defendants, including the FPS purchasers and an associated broker-dealer and market 
clearing firm,170 whom Sedona alleges all conspired to manipulate Sedona’s stock:171
“Sedona was in a position to be an industry leader when it was preyed upon by the 
defendants who orchestrated its downfall.”172  Although JAG cannot point to a clause in 
its securities purchase agreement that limits short sales, the reader will recall that the 
Internet Law Library and Sedona securities contracts both prohibited FPS purchasers 
165 Id. ¶ 37.
166 See id. ¶ 182.
167 See generally JagNotes.com Securities Purchase Agreement, dated June 12, 2000, and Sec. 2(a), 
available at http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1089029/000088981200002829/0000889812-00-
002829-0003.txt. 
168 See JAG Media Holdings Complaint, supra note 124, ¶¶ 163 & 169.
169 See infra text accompanying notes 287-98. 
170 See id. ¶¶ 2-28, 98, 99.
171 See id. ¶¶ 116-18, 134.
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from short selling.173  These companies thus allege market manipulation through 
violations of the short selling restrictions in their securities purchase agreements.174
(Sedona also alleges that investors engaged in unlawful naked short-selling and other 
manipulative conduct.)175
The only one of the five issuers discussed herein that did not allege market 
manipulation through short selling was Nanopierce Technologies.176  Instead, Nanopierce 
argued that its FPS purchaser manipulated its stock through large open-market sales—that 
is, that they just sold large amounts of stock in an attempt to depress its price.177  These 
sales reportedly accounted for 40% of Nanopierce trading volume over seven months and 
allegedly drove the stock’s price from $2.63/share to $0.51/share.178
3. Current Status of These Cases
Out of these five cases, Sedona and JAG Media Holdings are still in the pleadings 
stage and have not yet heard motions to dismiss.179  But the other three actions have all 
heard motions to dismiss.  These motions to dismiss will be examined in Part IV of this 
paper, however it suffices at this point to recognize that in all three cases the courts 
172 See id. ¶ 44.  
173 See supra notes 145-46. 
174 See Internet Law Library Complaint, supra note 121, ¶ 19 & 29-30; Sedona Securities Purchase 
Agreement Sec. 5.2, available at http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/ 
data/764843/000095011600001404/0000950116-00-001404-0004.txt
175 See Sedona Complaint, supra note 123, ¶¶ 114-18.
176 See Nanopierce Tech. Inc. v. Southridge Capital Mgmt LLC, Case No. 02-CV-0767, 2002 WL 
31819207 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 10, 2002) at n.6 (stating that Nanopierce dropped this claim at oral argument).  
Perhaps this was because there were no restrictions on Southridge’s ability to short sell in the securities 
purchase agreement.  See Nanopierce Purchase Agreement, dated Oct. 20, 2000, available at
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/827161/000092735600001950/0000927356-00-001950-0006.txt. 
177 See Nanopierce, 2002 WL 31819207 at 8.
178 See Nanopierce Complaint, supra note 122, ¶ 45 & table, p.14-18.
179
 As of February 18, 2004, the docket reports for Sedona and JAG Media Holdings indicate that no 
motions to dismiss have been heard by the courts.  See Civil Docket for Case #: 1:03-CV-03120, Sedona 
Corp. v. Ladenburg Thalmann, et al., (S.D.N.Y, J. Swain); Civil Docket for Case #: 02-CV-2867, JAG 
Media Holdings, et al. v. A.G. Edwards & Sons, et al., (S.D.N.Y., J. Gilmore).
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allowed the litigation to move forward and did not reject the issuers’ Section 10(b) 
misrepresentation and market manipulation arguments.  Log On America was dismissed 
without prejudice for being insufficiently pled,180 and then settled by the parties.181
Internet Law Library survived the defendant’s motion to dismiss182 but was eventually 
dismissed by the court for discovery violations.183 Nanopierce is thus the only case 
among the five to have both heard a motion to dismiss and to remain active in the 
courts.184
B)  GFL Advantage Fund, Ltd. v. Colkitt185
Aside from these actions in the Southern District of New York, there is another 
case that deserves attention in this paper, GFL Advantage Fund, Ltd. v. Colkitt.  GFL is a 
2001 decision in another Future Priced Securities case and is the only action (so far) to 
reach a final judgment in a federal court of appeals.186  Furthermore, GFL contains a 
lengthy analysis of Section 10(b) market manipulation claims in the context of death 
180 See Log On America, Inc. v. Promethean Asset Mgmt. LLC, et al., 223 F. Supp. 2d 435, 438 & n.2 
(S.D.N.Y. 2001) (stating that the complaint is dismissed without prejudice for being insufficiently pled but 
that the court was in no way ruling upon the ultimate merits of the complaint). 
181 See Civil Docket for Case #: 00-CV-06218, Log On America, Inc. v. Promethean Asset Mgmt. LLC, et 
al., (S.D.N.Y., J. Berman), Item # 39: Memo-Endorsement of Settlement Agreement, filed Feb. 6, 2002.  
The author has come across two other FPS actions that have also settled.  The other two cases are Ariad 
Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Promethean, et al., 99-CV-10794 (S.D.N.Y., J. Wood) (see Ariad Pharmaceuticals 
Jan. 14, 2000 8-K, available at http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/884731/0000950135-00-000141-
index.html), and Intelect Communications v. HFTP Investments, et al., 99-CV-04338 (S.D.N.Y., J. Chin) 
(see Intelect June 8, 1999, Form 8-K, available at http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/316672/ 
0000890566-99-000868-index.html).
182 See generally Internet Law Library, Inc. v. Southridge Cap. Mgmt, LLC, et al., 223 F. Supp. 2d 474 
(S.D.N.Y. 2002).
183
 Internet Law Library’s complaint was ultimately dismissed with prejudice by the district court on July 8, 
2003, but not for reasons germane to this paper.  The court dismissed the complaint as to all defendants for 
“plaintiffs’ repeated and flagrant disregard for the Court’s [discovery] orders.”  See Civil Docket for Case 
#: 1:01-CV-06600, Internet Law Library Inc. et al. v. Southridge Cap., et al. (S.D.N.Y., J. Carter), Item 
#161: Opinion.
184 See Nanopierce Tech., Inc. v. Southridge Cap. Mgmt. LLC et al., Case No. 02-CV-0767, 2002 WL 
31819207 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 10, 2002); Civil Docket for Case #: 1:02-CV-00767, Nanopierce Tech. Inc. v. 
Southridge Cap., et al. (S.D.N.Y., J. Sand).
185
 272 F.3d 189 (3d Cir. 2001).
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spiral litigation and, as a decision of a court of appeals, should have precedential value for 
the market manipulation claims discussed above.187 But, as will be demonstrated, GFL
poses a potential legal hurdle for FPS issuer/plaintiffs. 
1. GFL v. Colkitt – Facts of the Case & Relevance to Death Spiral Litigation
The facts of GFL parallel the facts of death spiral cases discussed in Part I and 
Part III.A above,188 but with a one twist.  GFL is like our classic case in that it involves a 
small issuer (two companies, actually) that suffered after issuing a Future-Priced 
Convertible Security.  The twist is that, instead of the companies issuing the FPS’s 
themselves, the majority shareholder and founder of the two companies created the FPS 
as collateral for a personal loan.189  But this difference does not distinguish GFL’s market 
manipulation analysis from other FPS litigation because market manipulation is not made 
more or less fraudulent based on who issues a security; instead, the focus of a market 
manipulation analysis is on the defendant’s conduct with respect to the market.190  Thus, 
GFL should have precedential value in resolving market manipulation claims in death 
spiral litigation.
The basic facts of GFL v. Colkitt are these: Douglas Colkitt was a doctor and 
businessman who founded two medical services companies, EquiMed, Inc. and National 
186
 The author has found no other FPS case that has reached a federal court of appeals.
187
 Of course, GFL is binding precedent only in the Third Circuit, however this paper assumes that it will 
have precedential value in the Southern District of New York as well to guide the resolution of the five 
death spiral cases discussed in Part III.A above.
188 See supra Part I.A, I.B, & III.A.
189
 There are procedural differences in GFL as well, but these are irrelevant.  Specifically, GFL Advantage 
Fund was an FPS purchaser and was suing to enforce the FPS against the issuer. This is immaterial, 
however, because the court evaluated the issuer/defendant’s counterclaims for non-enforcement of the FPS 
the same as it would if the issuer had been a plaintiff suing to void the FPS.
190
 See the discussion of market manipulation in Part IV.B, infra. 
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Medical Financial Services Corp. (“EquiMed” and “National Medical”).191  As the 
founder of these two companies, Colkitt was the majority shareholder and owned 73% of 
EquiMed stock and 38% of National Medical stock.192  At the time, EquiMed traded on 
the Over-the-Counter Bulletin Board,193 while National Medical traded on the Nasdaq 
National Market.194
In order to pursue other business opportunities Colkitt sought to turn his large 
stockholdings in these companies into cash.  Eventually, he turned to GFL Advantage 
Fund for financing.195  GFL and Colkitt signed two notes, one for $3 million and another 
for $10 million, which paid interest and allowed GFL to convert the notes into shares of 
EquiMed and National Medical stock at a discount to the market rate.196  Importantly, the 
notes did not restrict GFL’s right to short sell EquiMed or National Medical stock.197
Over the next few months, GFL began exercising its conversion rights.198  At the 
same time, however, GFL allegedly began short selling the stock of both companies, 
leading to significant drops in the value of EquiMed and National Medical stock.199
Watching the value of his companies disappear, Colkitt eventually decided not to honor 
GFL’s conversion rights and GFL sued.  Colkitt then counterclaimed against GFL asking 
the district court to void the FPS contracts on the grounds that GFL had manipulated the 
191 See GFL, 272 F.3d at 194.
192 Id.
193 See, e.g., EquiMed, Inc., Press Release dated July 21, 1998, contained within July 28, 1998 8-K Report, 
available at http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/892493/0000892493-98-000006.txt (indicating that 
EquiMed stock was traded on the Over-the-Counter Bulletin Board under the symbol “EQMD”).
194 See, e.g., National Medical Financial Services Prospectus, dated Sept. 9, 1996, available at
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/934548/0000912057-96-020093.txt (stating that “The Common 
Stock [of National Medical] [was] quoted on the Nasdaq National Market under the symbol ‘NMFS’.”).
195 See GFL, 272 F.3d at 194-95.
196 See GFL Advantage Fund, Ltd. v. Colkitt, Case No. 4:97-CV-0526, 2000 U.S. Dist. Lexis 21747 at 7-9 
(M.D. Pa. July 17, 2000).
197 Id. at 9.
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price of EquiMed and National Medical stock through its short sales.  But the court 
rejected this argument, holding that short selling by itself cannot be market manipulation: 
“it is not permissible to infer from short sales alone that the party engaging in short sales 
is engaged in market manipulation ….”200  The district court therefore dismissed Colkitt’s 
counterclaims and, enforcing the FPS, ordered Colkitt to pay $21 million in principal and 
accrued interest to GFL.201
2. GFL v. Colkitt – Implications for Death Spiral Litigation
The Third Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the district court’s judgment.202  The 
court held that Colkitt’s claim failed “because he cannot demonstrate that GFL engaged 
in any deceptive or manipulative conduct by injecting false inaccurate information into 
the marketplace or [by] creating a false impression of supply and demand for the 
stock.”203  Citing the Seventh Circuit’s decision in Sullivan & Long v. Scattered,204 the 
Third Circuit provided the following guidance:  
Unfortunately for Colkitt, [] short selling is lawful, and courts have held 
that short selling, even in massive volume, is neither deceptive nor 
manipulative when carried out in accordance with SEC rules and 
regulations.  Therefore, to make out a claim of market manipulation, 
Colkitt must present evidence that GFL engaged in some other type of 
deceptive behavior in conjunction with its short selling that either injected 
inaccurate information into the marketplace or created artificial demand 
for the securities.  Colkitt has offered nothing but evidence that GFL 
engaged in lawful short sales of National Medical and EquiMed, which 
198 GFL, 272 F.3d at 195.
199 Id. at 195-96.
200 See GFL, 2000 U.S. Dist. Lexis 21747 at 17.
201 Id. at 39.
202 See GFL, 272 F.3d at 215-16.  The court reversed the district court on a narrow point, finding that 
Colkitt did not need to show an effect on the prices of the EquiMed and National Medical securities due to 
GFL’s short selling in order for his claims to survive a motion to dismiss (though this would eventually be 
necessary if Colkitt’s claims were to ever succeed).  Id. at 206.
203 Id. at 207 (emphasis added).
204
 Sullivan & Long, Inc. v. Scattered Corp., 47 F.3d 857, 864 (7th Cir. 1995). 
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alone is insufficient to prevail on a claim of market manipulation in 
violation of Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5.205
GFL thus instructs that short selling, without more, is not a “manipulative device” 
within the meaning of Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 and therefore short selling by 
itself cannot be a basis for a Section 10(b) market manipulation claim.206  But the 
case leaves open an important question for death spiral litigants: “What ‘more’ is 
required?”
Part IV – Analysis
This paper will now analyze the securities fraud claims raised in death spiral 
cases.  As indicated in Part II above, there are two main causes of action,
misrepresentation claims and market manipulation claims.  This paper begins with an 
analysis of misrepresentation claims and groups these claims into three broad categories: 
misrepresentative investment intent, violations of promises with respect to short selling, 
and misrepresentations about business practices.  This paper will show that all three 
classes of argument have merit and (assuming relevant facts can be proved) potentially 
allow death spiral plaintiff/issuers to recover from defendant/purchasers.  Next, this paper 
will examine the market manipulation claims, showing that these too are valid.  As part of 
the analysis, this paper will argue that naked short selling is market manipulation and 
therefore that plaintiffs such as JAG Media Holdings who assert this cause of action 
assert valid prima face claims.  The analysis discusses naked short selling at some length 
because this is an as-yet-untested theory in the courts of the United States and, if 
established, would be significant to the future of death spiral litigation.
205 GFL, 272 F.3d at 211 (citation omitted).
206 Id. at 211.
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A)  Misrepresentation In Violation of Section 10(b)207 of the Securities Exchange Act and 
Rule 10b-5208 Promulgated Thereunder
     1. Standing to Sue, Elements of a Successful Claim, & Facial Validity of the Actions
As a threshold matter, FPS issuer/plaintiffs will have standing to sue the assorted 
defendants in death spiral actions (purchasers, brokers, and market makers) under the 
federal securities laws.  In the context of Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 litigation, courts 
have upheld the broad applicability of these anti-fraud provisions to many types of 
securities actions.  For instance, as early as 1971 the Supreme Court stated that Section 
10(b) “protects corporations as well as individuals who are sellers of a security.”209
Furthermore, Section 10(b) allows for lawsuits based on private placements (i.e., it is not 
restricted to sales in the secondary markets)210 and there is no limitation within these anti-
fraud provisions on the types of defendants that may be sued.  Instead, Section 10(b) is a 
broad “catch-all” anti-fraud provision.211  Thus, the question for FPS issuers in death 
207
 Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act states:
“It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means or instrumentality of 
interstate commerce or of the mails, or of any facility of any national securities exchange--
 (b) To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security registered on a national 
securities exchange or any security not so registered … any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance 
in contravention of such rules and regulations as the Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate 
in the public interest or for the protection of investors.”  15 U.S.C.A. § 78j (2004).
208
 Rule 10b-5 promulgated under Section 10(b) reads:
“It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means or instrumentality of 
interstate commerce, or of the mails or of any facility of any national securities exchange,
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material fact necessary in order to 
make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or would operate as a fraud or 
deceit upon any person, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security.”  17 C.F.R § 240.10b-5 
(2004).
209
 Superintendent of Ins. of New York v. Bankers Life and Casualty Co., 404 U.S. 6, 10 (1971).  See also 
Kaplan v. Utilicorp United, Inc., 9 F.3d 405, 407 (5th Cir. 1993) (“Standing to bring a private damages 
action under Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 is limited to persons who are defrauded in connection with the 
purchase or sale of securities.  This limitation is satisfied by showing ‘a nexus between the defendant's 
actions and plaintiff's purchase or sale.’” (internal citations omitted)).
210 Id. at 12.
211
 Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 202 (1976).
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spiral litigation is simply whether the elements of the cause of action will be met as 
against each defendant.
To state a cause of action for misrepresentation under Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-
5, a plaintiff must demonstrate five things:212 (1) a misrepresentation of a material fact or 
an omission of a material fact necessary to make information not misleading; (2) in 
connection with the purchase or sale of a security by the plaintiff; (3) made by the 
defendant, acting with scienter; (4) upon which the plaintiff reasonably relied; and (5) that 
caused the plaintiff to suffer damages.213  Based on these elements, FPS issuers have 
potentially successful claims for Section 10(b) misrepresentation against FPS purchasers. 
The reason for this is that all these elements may be potentially pled and proved at trial: 
stated broadly, if an FPS issuer can show that an FPS purchaser intentionally or recklessly 
deceived the issuer into selling the FPS and that the issuer suffered damages as a result, 
the issuer will be able to recover from the purchaser under Section 10(b).
But to say that these claims have facial validity does not provide much insight into 
death spiral lawsuits.  This paper thus focuses its analysis on the central legal question in 
these claims, materiality.  Materiality is the most important factor in the analysis of death 
spiral misrepresentation claims because materiality is a question of law214 whereas the 
other elements (reliance, scienter, “in connection with,” purchaser/seller, damages) are 
questions of fact—i.e., if can the FPS issuer show that it directly relied on specific 
212
 This is a basic introduction into a Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 cause of action, however some 
familiarity with these provisions is assumed on the part of the reader.  
213 See, e.g., Halperin v. eBanker USA.com, Inc., 295 F.3d 352, 356-57 (2d Cir. 2002); Newton v. Merrill 
Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 259 F.2d 154, 173 (3d Cir. 2001).
214 See, e.g., Ganino v. Citizens Utilities Co., 228 F.3d 154, 162 (2d Cir. 2000) (stating that materiality is a 
mixed question of law and fact).  This paper of course assumes away evidentiary issues and practical 
problems of proof at trial.  Instead, this paper accepts as true the facts alleged in death spiral complaints 
(see Part III) and attempts to determine whether these complaints have merit.
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misstatements by the defendants in connection with offering of its FPS to the defendant 
and that, in so relying, it suffered damages, the issuer can recover.  But materiality is a 
legal question that focuses attention on whether, even assuming the misrepresentations 
were actually made, they are something that the law and the courts should care about.  
Such is the focus of this paper.215
The test for materiality is provided by Supreme Court precedent.  Specifically, 
two Supreme Court cases, TSC Industries v. Northway216 and Basic Inc. v. Levinson,217
provide guidance on how to evaluate the materiality of an alleged misrepresentation.  
These cases instruct that a misrepresentation is material if, based on the total mix of 
information, there is a substantial likelihood that a reasonable investor would consider the 
information significant in deciding how to act.218  This test will now be applied to the 
misrepresentations alleged in the five death spiral cases discussed in Part III.A above.
     2. Evaluating Death Spiral Misrepresentation Claims
The misrepresentation claims raised by the five death spiral actions from the 
Southern District of New York studied in this paper can be broadly categorized into three 
groups: misrepresentations as to investment intent, misrepresentations as to short selling 
intentions, and misrepresentations as to prior business practices.219  The Log On America
litigation provides a useful starting point for analyzing these arguments because this case 
215
 The elements of a Section 10(b) cause of action often blend into one another.  In particular, the concept 
of materiality and reliance are interconnected.  With this in mind, this paper focuses its analysis of death 
spiral misrepresentation claims on questions of materiality, discussing the other Section 10(b) elements as 
necessary.
216
 426 U.S. 438 (1976).
217
 485 U.S. 224 (1988).
218 See id. at 231-32.  
219 See generally Log On America Complaint, supra note 121; Internet Law Library Complaint, supra note 
120; Nanopierce Complaint, supra note 122; Sedona Complaint, supra note 123; JAG Media Holdings 
Complaint, supra note 124.
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raises all three issues.220  First, Log On America alleged that the purchasers of its 
convertible security misrepresented in the securities purchase agreement that they were 
investing in the FPS to acquire stock “for investment only and not with a view toward, or 
for resale in connection with, the public sale or distribution thereof.”221  Instead, the 
company asserts, the defendants had no such “investment intent” at all but planned from 
the outset to manipulate the price of LOA stock downward and profit from its fall.222
Second, Log On America alleges that the defendants misrepresented their intentions with 
respect to short selling in that they promised to make only limited short sales223 knowing 
that this was false.224  Third, the company asserts that purchasers made a material 
omission when they failed to disclose “lawsuits asserted against them by similarly 
situated issuers” in other FPS contexts.225
The district court evaluated Log On America’s argument and dismissed it as 
insufficiently pled.226  First, with respect to the investment intent issue, the court ruled 
that Log On America did not specify how the defendants’ investment representations 
gave rise to actionable misconduct227 because language in the securities purchase 
agreement effectively nullified Log On America’s averments.228  Second, the court held 
that since the securities purchase agreement had allowed short sales (with restrictions) 
and Log On America failed to demonstrate any violations of these rules, the company 
failed to allege actionable misrepresentations as to the defendants’ short selling 
intentions.229  Third, the court was silent on the issue of whether the defendants had a 
220 See supra note 121. 
221 See Log On America Complaint, supra note 121, ¶ 30.
222 See id. ¶ 68.
223 See id. ¶ 31.
224 See id. ¶¶ 32 & 34.
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duty to disclose to the company that other lawsuits had been filed against them in 
connection with similar FPS offerings.230  This paper will now evaluate these three legal 
issues in detail.
a. Can Deceptive Statements as to “Investment Intent” Be a Section 10(b) 
Misrepresentation?
The first claim raised in Log On America is a charge that the defendants violated 
Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act by misrepresenting their “investment intent”—i.e., 
that the FPS purchasers committed fraud in deceiving LOA about their intentions with 
respect to their investment in Log On America’s Future Priced Security.  This is a 
common claim by FPS issuer/plaintiffs (of the six cases identified in this paper, three 
complaints raise such allegations)231 and this paper now reviews the merits of this 
argument.
Future Priced Securities are volatile instruments, and companies that issue them 
often fail.  A wise issuer will therefore want to divine the FPS purchaser’s investment 
intentions and to determine, if possible, whether the purchaser might attempt to abuse the 
225 See id. ¶ 66.
226 See Log On America, Inc. v. Promethean Asset Mgmt., et al., 223 F. Supp. 2d 435, 452 & 438 n.2 
(2001) (noting that the court was not ruling on the merits of Log On America’s causes of action, just the 
sufficiency of its pleadings).
227 Id. at 444.  The author identified three separate misrepresentation allegations in Log On America’s 
complaint, however the district court evaluated its claims under only two headings: short selling and 
investment intent.  See id. at 442-45.
228 Id. at 443 (showing that the Securities Purchase Agreement stated: “Buyer does not agree to hold any of 
the securities for any minimum or other specific term.”).
229 See id. 
230
 The court makes no mention of this issue in its Decision and Order, and only refers to Log On America’s 
alleged material omissions briefly.  See id. at 443 n.2.  It is the author’s opinion that the court overlooked 
this issue because it was not sufficiently identified as a separate claim for misrepresentation in the 
complaint.  Instead, the court evaluated all allegations of material misrepresentations and omissions 
together. 
231
 The three are Log On America, Internet Law Library, and Sedona.  Nanopierce alleges related 
misrepresentations, but not “investment intent” directly.  See Log On America Complaint, supra note 121,  
¶ 32; Internet Law Library Complaint, supra note 120, ¶ 14; Sedona Complaint, supra note 123, ¶ 54.  See 
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FPS by using it as the basis for short sales.  To protect against this risk issuers ask for 
confirmation of the purchasers’ intentions during negotiations over the FPS and by the 
terms of the securities purchase agreement.  Log On America, for instance, asked the 
purchasers of its FPS to profess their investment intent both during contract negotiations 
and in writing.232  Nevertheless, it is important to verify that these are material issues 
within the meaning of the securities laws that, if misrepresented, can form the basis for a 
Section 10(b) cause of action.
It appears clear that these claims are material.   Recalling the basic standard for 
materiality (information that a reasonable person would consider important in deciding 
how to act),233 investment intent with respect to an FPS offering is highly relevant 
because the issuer will want to know whether the purchaser is likely to cause a death 
spiral subsequent to investing in the FPS.  (Looked at another way, no company would 
issue an FPS to an investor who baldly stated that it was only interested in using the FPS 
as the basis for large short selling of the issuer’s stock.)  Th is conclusion is supported by 
caselaw.  First, of the three complaints studied in this paper that argued investment 
intent,234 two proceeded through motions to dismiss and in neither case did the court 
throw-out these claims as being immaterial (which the courts could have done).235
also Nanopierce Tech. Inc. v. Southridge Capital Mgmt. LLC, No. 02-CV-0767, 2002 WL 31819207 at 3 
(S.D.N.Y. Oct. 10, 2002).
232 See Log On America Complaint, supra note 121, ¶ 32.
233 See supra text accompanying notes 216-18.
234 See supra note 231.
235 See Internet Law Library, Inc. v. Southridge Capital Mgmt., LLC, 223 F. Supp. 2d 474, 480-86 
(S.D.N.Y. 2002) (holding that Internet Law Library’s misrepresentation claims sufficiently plead a cause of 
action so as to survive defendants’ motion to dismiss); Log On America, Inc. v. Promethean Asset Mgmt., 
LLC, 223 F. Supp. 2d 435, 443-45 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (dismissing Log On America’s investment intent 
argument because other clauses in the securities purchase agreement negated this claim by allowing 
Promethean to dispose of assets at any time).  Given that Internet Law Library survived the motion to 
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Second, this conclusion is supported by relevant securities law precedents such as the 
Supreme Court’s decision in Wharf (Holdings) Ltd. v. United Int’l Holdings, Ltd.236
Wharf involved a misrepresentation claim in which the purchaser of a security sued the 
seller alleging that the seller violated Section 10(b) when it sold the security while 
secretly never intending to honor the terms of the agreement.237  The Supreme Court 
upheld the claim and allowed recovery against the seller, finding that the secret intention 
to violate the terms of the securities purchase agreement was a material misrepresentation 
in connection with the sale of a security.238
To say that misstatements about investment intent can be a material 
misrepresentation with the meaning of Section 10(b) does not complete the analysis, 
however.  Since these allegations include both oral and written misstatements in the 
context of negotiating and executing securities purchase agreements, there are important 
contract law principles that will determine whether the misstatements should even be 
considered part of the securities contract.  First, there is a question of definiteness.  Courts 
will need to evaluate exactly what statements the defendants are alleged to have made to 
determine if these statements are sufficiently definite so as to proscribe particular 
conduct.239  Second, the parol evidence rule may potentially bar recovery for strictly oral 
misrepresentations where there was a contrary written agreement.
dismiss, this demonstrates the merit of the investment intent argument, because if this allegation had been 
immaterial the court properly should have dismissed it at that stage of the trial. 
236
 532 U.S. 588 (2001).
237 See id. at 590.
238 See id. at 596-97.
239 See 166 Mamaroneck Ave. Corp. v. 151 East Post Road Corp., 575 N.E.2d 104, 105 (N.Y. 1991) (“The 
doctrine of definiteness or certainty is well established in contract law.  In short, it means that a court cannot 
enforce a contract unless it is able to determine what in fact the parties have agreed to.”).
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Under general contract-law parol evidence principles, where a written agreement 
differs from oral statements of a party during negotiations, the written agreement will 
control.  This is especially true when there is a merger clause in the contract stating that 
the writing is the entire agreement of the parties.240  In the context of securities fraud 
actions under Section 10(b), however, courts may choose not to apply the parol evidence 
rule quite so rigorously.  The Second Circuit Court of Appeals, for instance, has doubted 
the correctness of applying parol evidence principles in the context of securities fraud 
cases because this could shield fraudulent oral misrepresentations, defeating the basic 
purpose of Section 10(b).241  Other courts, however, retain a stricter adherence to the 
parol evidence rule, even in the context of securities offerings.242
It therefore appears that claims of deceptive “investment intent” in death spiral 
litigation can reasonably be decided for or against FPS issuers, depending upon the facts 
and circumstances in each case and the willingness or unwillingness of a court to adhere 
to principles such as the parol evidence rule.  In terms of the cases studied in this paper, 
this renders support to Sedona Corp.’s allegations that the purchasers of its FPS violated 
Section 10(b) when they made oral misrepresentations of being “long-term investors” 
only interested in the “best long-term interest of Sedona”243 while the text of its securities 
purchase agreement reinforced this notion.244 These oral and written misrepresentations 
240 See, e.g., Global Intellicom v. Thomson Kernaghan & Co., 1999 WL 544708, at 11 (July 27, 1999) 
(holding that claims of oral misrepresentations in connection with a securities offering were not actionable 
where the securities offering contained contrary language and a merger clause).  
241 E.g. Caiola v. Citibank, 295 F.3d 312, 330 n.9 (2d Cir. 2002) (stating that the importation of parol 
evidence principles into the context of securities fraud cases is “questionable” because this acts to defeat the 
purposes of the antifraud provisions). 
242 See id. (discussing alternate court decisions on point); see also supra note 239. 
243 See Sedona Complaint, supra note 123, ¶ 43.
244 See Sedona Securities Purchase Agreement Sec. 3.1, available at http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/ 
data/3959/000093066100003254/0000930661-00-003254-0003.txt.
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taken together appear to be material and therefore justify recovery against the defendants
(provided that Sedona can to establish the definiteness of these misrepresentations).245
b. Is an Intentional Violation of a Promise or Restriction on Short-Selling a 
Section 10(b) Misrepresentation?
The preceding discussion shows that it is difficult to predict the outcome of 
misrepresentation claims over statements of “investment intent,” in part because of 
questions of definiteness.  In contrast, violations of more definite contract terms, such as 
prohibitions against short selling, have a more predictable outcome.  A number of death 
spiral complaints allege Section 10(b) misrepresentation in that purchasers (and 
occasionally brokers and market makers as well) misrepresented to the issuers that they 
would not sell the issuers’ stock short and then did exactly that.246  These claims should 
be actionable as 10(b) misrepresentation where the issuer can show an intentional 
violation of a contracted-for short-selling restriction in a securities purchase agreement.  
Claims based on oral misrepresentations may be valid as well.  
An intentional violation of a substantive clause in a securities purchase agreement 
will be actionable under Section 10(b) where the clause was material to the agreement.  
Making a specific promise to perform a particular act in the future while 
secretly intending not to perform that act may violate Section 10(b) where 
the promise is part of the consideration for the transfer of securities.  Such 
a promise, however, must encompass particular actions and be more than a 
generalized promise to act as a faithful fiduciary.247
245 Cf. One-On-One Enterprises, Inc. v. Caruso, 848 F.2d 1283 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (holding that an integration 
clause in securities contract nullified prior oral misrepresentations about the “long-term” investment horizon 
of purchaser rendering the oral misrepresentations not actionable).
246 Log On America, Internet Law Library, and Sedona alleged this directly.  See Log On America 
Complaint, supra note 121, ¶ 31; Internet Law Library Complaint, supra note 120, ¶¶ 14 & 17; and Sedona 
Complaint, supra note 123, ¶ 68.  Nanopierce evidently alleged this and then dropped it at trial.  See 
Nanopierce Complaint ¶ 32; 2002 WL 31819207 at 4 n.6.
247
 Luce v. Edelstein, 802 F.2d 49, 55 (2d Cir. 1986) (internal citations omitted) reaffirmed in Mills v. Polar 
Molecular Corp., 12 F.3d 1170, 1176 (2d Cir. 1993) (“The failure to carry out a promise made in 
connection with a securities transaction is normally a breach of contract.  It does not constitute fraud unless, 
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Short selling restrictions are such material promises.  Issuers demand these restrictions in 
order to prevent death spirals and this is an issue that a reasonable issuer would consider 
significant in deciding whether to issue the security.248  Thus, where a purchaser and 
issuer sign a securities purchase agreement that prohibits or restricts short sales by the 
purchaser and the purchaser then violates those contract terms, a Section 10(b) cause of 
action will arise.
But to show actionable securities fraud in this context, the issuer will have to 
demonstrate that the purchaser intended to break this provision at the time the offering 
was made.  Simply showing that a purchaser violated short selling restrictions in a 
securities purchase agreement is not enough; that would be breach of contract, but not 
securities fraud.249  Instead, the plaintiff must show that the defendant never intended to 
abide by the short selling restrictions.  This is necessary because of the “in connection 
with a purchase or sale of securities” requirement under Section 10(b)—that is, if the 
issuer cannot show that the purchaser made a material misrepresentation about its 
intentions to abide by short selling restrictions in a securities purchase agreement, there 
will be no securities fraud because the misrepresentation did not occur in connection with 
the sale.250
when the promise was made, the defendant secretly intended not to perform or knew that he could not 
perform.”).
248 See supra notes 216-18 and accompanying text.
249 See, e.g., Broad v. Rockwell Int’l Corp., 614 F.2d 418, 438-39 (5th Cir. 1980) (discussing and 
demonstrating that not every breach of a securities contract is a securities fraud). 
250 See supra notes 212-13 and accompany text.  This discussion demonstrates how these Sec. 10(b) 
concepts are interrelated.  Also, because of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, plaintiffs 
also must plead with particularity facts giving rise to a strong inference of defendants’ scienter.  See 15 
U.S.C. § 78u-4 (2004); Pirraglia v. Novell, Inc., 339 F.3d 1182, 1187-88 (9th Cir. 2003).
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The analysis for strictly oral misrepresentations is different, however, and 
proceeds under the framework laid out in subparagraph (a) above.  As indicated in that 
discussion, FPS issuers will have a cause of action if a court decides to admit parol 
evidence associated with the securities offering.251  Turning to the cases in this paper, the 
Internet Law Library252 litigation provides an example of these principles at work.  In 
Internet Law Library, the court rejected the defendants’ motion to dismiss, finding that 
the company’s misrepresentation claim was actionable when it was based on 
misstatements about short selling intentions.253  Although the facts of Internet Law 
Library indicate that there were short selling restrictions in its securities purchase 
agreement, the text of the decision indicates that the court was unconcerned with whether 
the short-selling promises were oral or written.254  The court, finding this to be a material 
misrepresentation, adopted a liberal interpretation of the parol evidence rule and allowed 
the claim.
c. Is Failing to Disclose Prior FPS Deals a Section 10(b) Misrepresentation?
A final common complaint of FPS issuers is that purchasers have misrepresented 
their prior business practices.  Specifically, issuers allege that purchasers misrepresented 
themselves as not having engaged in prior FPS offerings or not having caused “death 
spirals” before when, in fact, the purchasers had done so repeatedly.255  These alleged 
misrepresentations and omissions occurred in the context of negotiations over the FPS 
offering and are a form of fraud in the inducement: the issuers allege that the purchasers 
251 See supra text accompanying notes 240-42.
252 See supra Part III.A. 
253 See Internet Law Library v. Southridge Capital Mgmt., et al., 223 F. Supp. 2d 474, 482 (S.D.N.Y. 2002).
254 See id. at 478-80 & 482.
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violated Sec. 10(b) by misrepresenting themselves and that the issuers never would have 
issued the FPS’s if they had known the background of their ‘investors.’  These claims 
should be actionable because in a private placement such as an FPS, this information will 
be material.  
In making these claims, FPS issuers must consider two important points.  First, 
the issuers must show that the purchasers lied or omitted information in response to an 
inquiry from the issuer.  The reason for this is that FPS purchasers do not have a duty of 
disclosure.  Courts do not recognize a generalized duty to disclose all material 
information in the context of negotiating a securities agreement, yet any 
misrepresentation claim must be rooted in a misstatement or an omission coupled with a 
duty.256  Second, the misstatement or omission must not be contradicted by other 
information available to the issuer, such as through disclosures in the securities offering 
documents.  “Over and again we say that people claiming to be victims of securities fraud 
may not claim to rely on oral statements inconsistent with written documents (even 
tedious prospectuses) available to them.”257  If the information that the issuer complains 
of is contained in writings that were available to the issue, the issuer will be considered to 
have had constructive notice of these facts and so will have no basis for recovery due to 
contrary oral misstatements. 
255 See Log On America Complaint, supra note 121, ¶ 56; Internet Law Library Complaint, supra note 120, 
¶ 14; Nanopierce Complaint, supra note 122, ¶ 34; Sedona Complaint, supra note 123, ¶ 50.
256 E.g., McCormick v. Fund American Co. Inc., 26 F.3d 869 (9th Cir. 1994).  
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B)  Market Manipulation In Violation of Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 
     1. Elements In A Successful Claim
The second broad category of securities fraud claims raised in the death spiral 
lawsuits studied in this paper are market manipulation claims.  The text of Section 10(b) 
of the Securities Exchange Act prohibits the use of any “manipulative or deceptive 
device” in connection with the purchase or sale of a security,258 and market manipulation 
claims thus derive from this language.  Manipulation in this context is “a term of art” that 
“connotes intentional or willful conduct designed to deceive or defraud investors by 
controlling or artificially affecting the price of securities.”259  In particular, the term 
“market manipulation” refers to fraudulent practices such as wash sales, matched orders, 
or rigged prices that are intended to mislead investors by creating an artificial appearance 
of market activity.260
To sustain a Section 10(b) market manipulation in the Southern District of New 
York, a plaintiff must allege the following five elements: (1) that the plaintiff suffered 
damages; (2) in reliance on the defendant’s material misrepresentations, omissions, or 
scheme to defraud; (3) that the defendant acted with scienter; (4) that this occurred in 
connection with plaintiff’s purchase or sale of a security; and (5) that this was furthered 
by the defendant’s use of the mails or a national securities exchange.261  This test comes 
from cases such as Schell v. Conseco, Inc.262 and Global Intellicom v. Thomson 
257
 S.E.C. v. Jakubowski, 150 F.3d 675, 681 (7th Cir. 1998).
258
 15 U.S.C. § 78j (2004).
259
 Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 199 (1976).
260
 Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 476 (1977).
261 E.g, Schnell v. Conseco, Inc., 43 F. Supp. 2d 438, 448 (S.D.N.Y. 1999).
262 Id.
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Kernaghan & Co.263  In contrast, the Third Circuit examines market manipulation claims 
a bit differently.  GFL Advantage Fund v. Colkitt 264 explains that the elements of a 
private plaintiff’s market-manipulation claim are: (1) the defendant engaged in deceptive 
or manipulative conduct by injecting inaccurate information into the marketplace or by 
creating a false impression of supply and demand for a security; (2) in connection with 
plaintiff’s purchase or sale of the security; (3) that the defendant had the purpose of 
artificially depressing or inflating the price of the security [i.e., acted with scienter]; and 
(4) that the plaintiff suffered damages (5) in reliance on the defendant’s conduct.265  This 
paper will evaluate FPS market manipulation claims primarily using the GFL standard, 
because it is the superior test.266 Nevertheless, this paper will turn to the Schnell/Global 
Intellicom approach for comparison given that most FPS actions will be decided in the 
Southern District of New York (and so will apply the Schnell/Global Intellicom
language).267  In the end, though, these two tests should yield similar results when applied 
to the same set of facts so it ultimately should not matter which test a court applies. 
     2. Evaluating Death-Spiral Complaints
263
 No. 99-CV-0342, 1999 WL 544708 at 7 (S.D.N.Y. July 27, 1999).
264
 272 F.3d 189 (3d Cir. 2001). 
265 See id. at 206-11.  
266
 The two tests list the same basic elements, they just express them differently.  For instance, the GFL-test 
examines materiality in greater depth (due to the Third Circuit’s lengthy examination of short-selling law in 
its opinion) but ignores Sec. 10(b)’s link to the use of the mails, a national securities exchange, or interstate 
commerce (because, under modern conceptions of these terms, this statutory hook will always be met in 
securities cases and so this is a non-issue).  The reason GFL is superior is that the Third Circuit came up 
with this test after a lengthy investigation of the law related to 10(b) market manipulation claims and after 
specific application of the law to an FPS issuer’s short-selling claims.  See supra Part III.B discussing GFL 
v. Colkitt.  In contrast, the Schnell/ Global Intellicom approach is not so tailored.  Compare GFL, 272 F.3d
at 203-12, with Schnell, 43 F. Supp. 2d at 448 and Global Intellicom, 1999 WL 544708 at 7.
267
 For example, Nanopierce, Internet Law Library, and Log On America all follow the Schnell/Global 
Intellicom standard (see 2002 WL 31819207 at 6; 223 F. Supp. 2d at 487; 223 F. Supp. 2d at 445) 
notwithstanding the approach taken in GFL.  These district courts surely apply Schnell/Global Intellicom 
because that is the test applicable in the Second Circuit.
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GFL Advantage Fund, Ltd. v. Colkitt is an appropriate starting point to analyze 
market manipulation claims in the context of death spiral litigation because it is a final 
judgment from a federal appeals court and is factually similar to this paper’s “classic 
case” FPS.268  The reader will recall that in GFL the majority shareholder of two small 
companies (Mr. Colkitt) had issued a Future Priced Security as collateral for a loan and 
was sued by the purchaser for failing to convert it.  Mr. Colkitt argued that the conversion 
should be excused because the purchasers had caused a death spiral in the two companies 
through massive short selling of their securities.269 But like most FPS’s,270 Mr. Colkitt 
had imposed no short selling restrictions, and so the court enforced the FPS.271  Thus, 
GFL, like Nanopierce272 and JAG Media Holdings273 (and this paper’s “classic case” 
Future Priced Security)274 involved an FPS offering in which there were no short selling 
restrictions in the FPS purchase agreement.  (The reader is reminded that Sedona275 and 
Internet Law Library276 did contain prohibitions on short selling in their securities 
purchase agreements while Log On America277 prohibited naked short selling.) 
To begin, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals rejected Mr. Colkitt’s market 
manipulation claim because the court determined that he failed to demonstrate that the 
purchaser, GFL Advantage Fund, had engaged in any deceptive or manipulative 
268 See supra Part III.B. and text accompanying notes 18-25.
269 See supra text accompanying notes 191-201.
270 See supra notes 24-25 and accompanying text.
271 See supra note 197 and accompanying text. 
272 See supra note 147 and accompanying text.
273 See supra note 148 and accompanying text.
274 See supra text accompanying note 25.
275 See supra note 146 and accompanying text.
276 See supra note 145 and accompanying text.
277 See supra note 149 and accompanying text.
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conduct.278  The court thus focused its attention on the first element in its five-part test 
(see above).279  With respect to “injecting inaccurate information into the marketplace,” 
the court dismissed Colkitt’s argument that short sales, by their very nature, “convey to 
the market participants negative information about the prospects of the firm.”280
Although the court recognized that short sales convey a negative opinion of a stock by the 
short seller, the court reasoned that they do not distort the market or otherwise inject false 
information because there is nothing inherently improper about short selling.281
The Third Circuit also provided guidance on the issue of “creating a false 
impression of supply and demand for a security” under its test.282  Accepting the Seventh 
Circuit Court of Appeals’ rationale of Sullivan & Long, Inc. v. Scattered, Corp.,283 the 
Third Circuit reasoned that short selling—even massive short selling—does not create a 
false impression of supply and demand in the market because there are other parties 
betting against these transactions.284  “[S]hort selling, even in large volumes, is not in and 
of itself unlawful and therefore cannot be regarded as evidence of market 
manipulation.”285  The court concluded that to show market manipulation through short 
selling a plaintiff would have to show some manipulative factor in addition to the short 
selling; short selling by itself is simply not enough.286
278 See GFL Advantage Fund, Ltd. v. Colkitt, 272 F.3d 189, 207 (3d Cir. 2001).
279 See supra text accompanying note 265.
280 See GFL, 272 F.3d at 208.
281 See id.
282 See supra text accompanying note 265.
283
 47 F.3d 857, 864 (7th Cir. 1995).
284 See GFL, 272 F.3d at 207.
285 Id. at 209.
286 See id. at 207-208 & 211 (“Therefore, to make out a claim of market manipulation, Colkitt must present 
evidence that GFL engaged in some other type of deceptive behavior in conjunction with its short selling 
that either injected inaccurate information into the marketplace or created artificial demand for the 
securities.  Colkitt has offered nothing but evidence that GFL engaged in lawful short sales of National 
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a. What Does GFL v. Colkitt Instruct About Naked Short Selling Claims?
This therefore begs the question of what would have been sufficient to find 
actionable market manipulation; what ‘else’ is required?  In particular, one of the 
interesting claims raised in death spiral lawsuits is that defendants have engaged in naked 
short selling in order to depress the issuer’s stock price and that this should be deemed 
market manipulation.  Of the five death spiral complaints analyzed in this paper, Sedona 
and JAG Media Holdings both allege that the defendants engaged in naked short selling 
and that this should be viewed as manipulative.287 What is the likely outcome of these 
claims?  
It is unclear based solely on GFL whether a court would find naked short selling 
to be market manipulation, but this paper argues that it should be so declared.  There are 
no court decisions that explicitly support this conclusion288 (although the SEC considers 
naked short selling to be a potentially manipulative practice289 as do some 
commentators)290 while, contrarily, there is precedent suggesting that naked short selling 
is not manipulative.291
For example, a court following GFL could reason that the intent to cause fails-to-
deliver by naked short selling inflates beneficial ownership of a security292 and therefore 
creates a “false impression of supply and demand” for the security in violation of the GFL 
Medical and EquiMed, which alone is insufficient to prevail on a claim of market manipulation in violation 
of Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5.”).
287 See, e.g., JAG Media Holdings Complaint, supra note 124, ¶ 169.
288 See supra note 112 and accompanying text.
289 See supra notes 113-15 and accompanying text. 
290 See HAZEN, supra note 111. 
291 See infra notes 303-08 and accompanying text.
292 See supra text accompanying note 69.
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market manipulation test.293  A court could also conclude that intentional naked short 
sales violate market rules (such as brokers’ delivery requirements)294 and therefore “inject 
false information into the marketplace,” similarly violating the GFL test.295  These are 
potential ways in which naked short selling could be deemed market manipulation.  The 
GFL decision lists some practices that courts have held to be market manipulation in 
other cases, including trading through false accounts, engaging in sham transactions or 
unreported transactions, and making secret agreements or matched orders.296
Conspicuously absent from this list is naked short selling (because no court has yet held 
that naked short selling is a manipulative practice).  But naked short selling, like the list 
of practices enumerated in GFL as market manipulations, is a violation of market rules 
and equitable trading principles.297  In fact, the notion that naked short selling is 
manipulative because it violates equitable trading practices underlies the SEC’s 
assessment of this issue.298  Thus, naked short selling is clearly in the same league as 
other practices that have previously been declared to be market manipulations.  It should 
be so found.  
The problem with this interpretation and application of GFL, though, is that it 
runs headlong into Sullivan & Long, Inc. v. Scattered, Corp.299 Sullivan & Long is one of 
the few cases to deal with the issue of naked short selling and was cited approvingly in 
293 See supra text accompanying note 265.
294 See supra notes 85 & 97 and accompanying text, discussing NYSE Rule 440.10C and NASD Rule 3370.
295 See supra text accompanying note 265.
296
 GFL Advantage Fund, Ltd. v. Colkitt, 272 F.3d 189, 207-08 (3d Cir. 2001).
297 See Short Sales of Securities, Securities Exchange Act Release No. 34-4476 (April 25, 1962), available 
at 1962 WL 69297. 
298 See id. (“If a dealer intends not to consummate a transaction promptly, and fails to disclose this intention 
to his customer, he omits to state to that customer a material fact necessary to make the above representation 
not misleading, in violation of the antifraud provisions of the Securities Act and the Exchange Act.”).  
299 See Sullivan & Long Inc. v. Scattered Corp., 47 F.3d 857 (7th Cir. 1995). 
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GFL.300 Sullivan & Long holds that naked short selling is not in and of itself 
manipulative under Section 10(b),301 and so this case is problematic for the position 
advocated herein and argued by death spiral plaintiffs.  If a court is ever to declare that 
naked short selling is market manipulation, it will need to distinguish or discredit the 
result in Sullivan & Long.  This can be done.
Naked short selling should be declared to be a manipulative device in violation of 
Section 10(b) (i.e., naked short selling should suffice as that ‘something more’ required 
under GFL)302 where the naked short seller violates a market rule or equitable trading 
principle.  Sullivan & Long can then be distinguished on this point.  Sullivan & Long 
involved a lawsuit brought by a securities purchaser against a market maker of LTV Steel 
Corp for alleged market manipulation of LTV stock.303  The plaintiff, Sullivan & Long, 
Inc., claimed that the market maker (Scattered Corp.) engaged in massive uncovered short 
selling of LTV stock304 and that this depressed the value of LTV stock, causing Sullivan 
& Long to lose money.305  In this way, Sullivan & Long alleged that Scattered caused a 
sort of death spiral (although Scattered of course had no Future Priced Security through 
which to cover its short sales).  
What Sullivan & Long failed to recognize, however, was that Scattered had an 
edge: superior information.  At the time, LTV was emerging from a bankruptcy 
reorganization and Scattered knew (because it had read the bankruptcy reorganization 
plan) that LTV stock would soon be hugely devalued once the reorganization was 
300 See GFL, 272 F.3d at 207.
301 See Sullivan & Long, 47 F.3d at 864-65. 
302 See supra notes 285-86 and accompanying text.
303 See Sullivan & Long, 47 F.3d at 859.
304 See id. at 
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approved.306  (This information was not secret or proprietary, Scattered was just paying 
closer attention than other market participants.)  Thus, Scattered thus took advantage of 
this information by short selling LTV stock until it approached the inevitable post-
reorganization value.307
The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals found no problem with Scattered’s 
activities because what it was doing was arbitraging the security toward its true value.  
“The name for what Scattered did is not market manipulation, but arbitrage.”308  But an 
important factor in this result was that Scattered had not violated any rules of the 
securities exchange in conducting its naked short sales.309  At the time, the Chicago 
Stock Exchange (where LTV stock was trading) had no rules preventing naked short 
selling and Scattered’s naked short sales thus did not violate any market rules.  This is a 
sufficient legal reason to distinguish the holding of Sullivan & Long from the principles 
advocated herein.  
What is more, there are a number of practical reasons to distinguish Sullivan & 
Long from the rule advocated above with respect to death spiral litigation.  First, Sullivan 
& Long involved naked short selling in the market for an exchange-traded security of a 
large company.  LTV stock was listed on the New York Stock Exchange310 and so was 
subject to the full panoply of SEC and exchange-related short-selling regulations, 
including Rule 10a-1’s “tick test.”311  Moreover, LTV was a large industrial company 
305 See id. at 859-61.
306 See id at 859-60.
307 See id. at 860-61.
308 See id. at 862.
309 See id. at 861.
310 See, e.g., LTV Corp. Files for Protection from Creditors Under Chapter 11, WALL ST. J. (July 18, 1986) 
available at 1986 WL-WSJ 257412.
311 See supra text accompanying notes 78-81. 
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with assets of $6 billion,312 a liquid market for its stock, and extensive coverage on Wall 
Street and in the financial press.  In short, it was appropriate for the Seventh Circuit to 
decide Sullivan & Long from the perspective of the Efficient Capital Markets Hypothesis 
(“ECMH”) and trust that the market was ‘finding’ the correct value for the stock when 
Scattered was making uncovered short sales.313  None of these conditions apply in the 
context of Future Priced Securities cases, however.  
The result in Sullivan & Long should be distinguished from death spiral cases 
because FPS issuers are universally small, financially weak companies, trading in
inefficient, illiquid markets that lack regulatory protections such as short-sale pricing 
rules.  Thus, the ECMH does not apply to instruct that the market, if left alone, can be 
trusted to ‘correctly’ price the value of FPS issuers’ securities.  Instead, it is much easier 
for one market participant to move the price of the stock.  It therefore would be 
inappropriate to allow naked short selling of these securities because there simply will not 
be sufficient market interest in these companies to maintain the value of their securities in 
the face of a determined naked short seller.  This is borne-out by the fact that FPS issuers 
almost universally suffer stock declines after issuing their securities314 and the reasonable 
inference that the massive short- selling by FPS purchasers is a cause of this.
A second practical reason to set Sullivan & Long aside from death spiral cases is 
that the defendant in Sullivan & Long had virtually perfect pricing information.  Scattered 
312 See, e.g., LTV Corp. Files for Protection from Creditors Under Chapter 11, supra note 299. 
313
 The Efficient Capital Markets Hypothesis as generally proposed states that the price of a stock trading in 
an efficient market will reflect all publicly available information about the company.  Some of the measures 
of an efficient market for a stock are taken as: large trading volume in the stock (liquidity), a significant 
number of reviewing analysts, the existence of market makers and arbitrageurs, eligibility to register 
securities on Form S-3, and historical responsiveness of the stock’s price to market news.  For a discussion 
of the ECMH, see Robert G. Newkirk, Sufficient Efficiency: Fraud on the Market in the Initial Public 
Offering Context, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 1393 (1991).
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Inc. had been paying close attention to LTV’s bankruptcy filings and knew with virtual 
certainty that, after the reorganization, the company’s stock would become worth only 3 
or 4 cents (a significant drop from the previous market price).315  Scattered therefore 
could short sell with virtually no risk and it was reasonable, ex post, for a court to view 
this conduct as efficient and productive: there was an objectively calculable ‘correct’ 
market value for LTV stock.  But perfect pricing information will rarely exist. And for 
small companies like FPS issuers that have variable income streams and uncertain 
business plans, it is highly unlikely that anyone will be able to price the stock as 
accurately as Scattered priced LTV.  Thus, naked short selling of an FPS issuer’s stock is 
much more likely to mark the actions of a stock manipulator than it is to be a sign of a 
well-informed arbitrageur.  
b. Should GFL Be Relied Upon?
The preceding discussion has argued that naked short selling should be declared to 
be a manipulative practice in violation of Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 where it violates 
market rules and that this result is consistent with caselaw and securities law principles.  
This is a potentially important legal result in that it would for the first time answer a basic 
question about the practice of naked short selling.  To reach this conclusion, this paper 
has relied heavily on the reasoning in GFL Advantage Fund, Ltd. v. Colkitt, but has not 
yet examined the basic correctness of that decision.  This paper now examines that 
foundational issue. 
314 See supra text accompanying notes 31-33.
315 See Sullivan & Long Inc. v. Scattered Corp., 47 F.3d 857, 860 (7th Cir. 1995). 
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As previously indicated, GFL stands for the proposition that short selling, without 
more, is not actionable 10(b) market manipulation.316  The Third Circuit in GFL engaged 
in a lengthy examination of caselaw to reach this conclusion,317 and the court’s legal 
analysis will not be retold.318  The correctness of the decision instead can be demonstrated 
by positing potential alternate holdings and demonstrating that none of these alternatives 
would have been sound.  
First, the court had to reject Mr. Colkitt’s argument that short selling alone could 
amount to market manipulation because this would have undermined the securities 
markets.  Short selling is permitted under the federal securities laws because it has market 
benefits319 and to have declared that it can be manipulative within the meaning of Section 
10(b) would potentially criminalize an entire market-wide practice.  The court was in no 
position to do that.  Thus, it had to draw lines around permissible and impermissible short 
selling.  This is exactly what its holding does.320  Second (and more realistically), the 
court potentially could have accepted some of Colkitt’s narrower arguments.  For 
instance, Colkitt argued that the large volume of GFL short sales amounted to market 
manipulation and that the court should could adopt a rule separating legal from illegal 
short selling by examining a rule with volume restrictions.321 But rejecting this argument 
was also proper because this would have involved the court in hopeless line-drawing: 
316 See supra note 206 and accompanying text.
317 See GFL Advantage Fund, Ltd. v. Colkitt, 272 F.3d 189, 202-12 (3d Cir. 2001).
318
 This paper has discussed GFL at length and it is not the purpose to simply be a casenote on the validity 
of the decision.  However, this paper concludes that the Third Circuit’s legal analysis was correct.
319 See supra note 44-47 and accompanying text.
320
 The court of course might have accepted some of Colkitt’s narrower arguments, such as that GFL’s use 
of multiple brokers was evidence of concealment, but those are line-drawing questions that also support the 
fundamental holding that short selling by itself is not market manipulation.  See GFL Advantage Fund, Ltd. 
v. Colkitt, 272 F.3d 189, 210 (3d Cir. 2001).
321 See id. at 209.
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how much short selling is ‘too much’ so as to become manipulative (and how would a 
court of law even answer this question)?  There is only one flaw in GFL’s analysis, but it 
does not undermine the decision or discredit the court’s holding.322
c. What Does This Analysis Imply About Market Manipulation Claims that 
Allege Violations of a Securities Purchase Agreement?
Based on this discussion, it is apparent that death spiral plaintiff/issuers who argue 
that a defendant engaged in market manipulation solely by short selling the issuer’s stock 
will not have cognizable claims.  Instead, plaintiffs must allege that a defendant also 
engaged in a manipulative practice, such as naked short selling or one of the practices 
enumerated in GFL.323  But what about violating the terms of a securities purchase 
agreement—is that enough?  This section takes up this question. 
A final issue raised in this analysis is whether short selling can be market 
manipulation where it is done in violation of a securities purchase agreement.  In terms of 
the death spiral complaints reviewed in Part III of this paper, three companies made such 
allegations.  (Internet Law Library and Sedona argued market manipulation when 
defendants allegedly violated prohibitions on short selling contained in their securities 
purchase agreements,324 while Log On America alleged that the purchasers of its FPS 
322
 The Third Circuit in GFL evidently failed to appreciate that SEC short-selling Rules 10a-1 and 10a-2 
apply only to exchange-traded securities and do not apply to over-the-counter companies such as EquiMed 
and National Medical.  See GFL, 272 F.3d at 212 (“Perhaps, if Colkitt had offered evidence that GFL’s 
short sales violated SEC rules (for instance, if GFL failed to cover properly the short sales in violation of 
Rule 10a-2, or if GFL made short sales below the last sales price in violation of Rule 10a-1), Colkitt might 
have been able to establish that GFL’s conduct was intentionally or recklessly manipulative or deceptive.”). 
But this minor mistake does not undermine the court’s holding (indeed, it is consistent with the holding and, 
furthermore, supports this paper’s argument that naked short selling in violation of market rules is 
manipulative).  
323 See supra note 296.
324 See Internet Law Library, Inc. v. Southridge Capital Mgmt., LLC, 223 F. Supp. 2d 474, 486-87 
(S.D.N.Y. 2002); Sedona Complaint, supra note 123, ¶ 68.
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violated short-selling volume restrictions.)325  Assuming that the plaintiffs’ allegations are 
true, these claims would certainly amount to breach of contract.  But the question of 
securities fraud is more complex; breach of a securities contract does not per se imply 
securities fraud.326  Returning to the GFL and Schnell/Global Intellicom market 
manipulation tests, the question would be whether violating the terms of a securities 
contract with respect to short selling amounts to (under GFL) “deceptive or manipulative 
conduct [that] inject[s] inaccurate information into the marketplace or [creates] a false 
impression of supply or demand,” or is (under Schnell) a “material misrepresentation, 
omission, or scheme to defraud.”327  Based on the language of these two tests, it appears 
that these analyses could generate contrary results, though they ought not do so.
Under GFL, these arguments would likely fail.  By the language of the GFL 
market manipulation test, it is difficult to see how violating the terms of a securities 
purchase agreement “injects inaccurate information into the marketplace” or “creates a 
false impression of supply and demand for a security” because the terms of a bilateral 
securities contract have no bearing on the market for the security.  (In fact, if the terms of 
the contract were not public, the market would not even be aware of the violation at all.)  
GFL emphasizes the point that the court is looking for an effect on the market and so 
implies that a breach of a securities contract will not amount to market manipulation.328
In contrast, the language of the Schnell/Global Intellicom test is more favorable to these 
arguments because that test only looks broadly for a material “scheme to defraud.”  A 
325 See supra note 149; Log On America, Inc. v. Promethean Asset Mgmt., LLC, 223 F. Supp. 2d 435, 444-
47 (S.D.N.Y. 2001).
326 E.g., Broad v. Rockwell Int’l Corp., 614 F.2d 418, 438-39 (5th Cir. 1980).
327 See supra text accompanying notes 261 & 265.
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court might accept an FPS issuer’s argument that, for instance, a defendant engaged in 
market manipulation when it promised not to engage in short selling activity and then 
broke this promise because it was an integral part of a scheme to defraud.  These two tests 
therefore facially support different results, however they ought not produce different 
outcomes if applied correctly. 
These two tests ought to lead to the same result: that these claims are not 
actionable.  This conclusion follows from understanding why the GFL test is superior to 
the Schnell/Global Intellicom test.  To begin, the Schnell/Global Intellicom test was 
drawn from prior market manipulation caselaw in the Southern District of New York 
without revision.329  The courts thus took a general test and applied it to whatever market 
manipulation claims were raised by the plaintiffs.  Yet the lack of refinement of this 
general test to the specific context of short selling is a major oversight, because short 
selling is acknowledged as a legitimate market activity.  To say that short selling by itself 
can be part of a ‘scheme to defraud’ runs contrary to the essential validity of the practice. 
What is more, the Schnell/Global Intellicom test ignores important market manipulation 
precedents cited in GFL including Santa Fe Indus. v. Green,330 Gurary v. Winehouse,331
328 See GFL, 272 F.3d 189, 204-05 (emphasizing that the key to market manipulation is injecting false 
information into the market).
329 See Schnell v. Conseco, Inc., 43 F. Supp. 2d 438, 448 (S.D.N.Y. 1999); Global Intellicom Inc. v. 
Thomas Kernaghan & Co. et al., 1999 U.S. Dist. Lexis 11378, at 21-22 (S.D.N.Y. 1999).
330 See GFL, 272 F.3d 189, 204-05 (3d Cir. 2001) (“The Supreme Court has indicated that market 
manipulation ‘generally refers to practices, such as wash sales, matched orders, or rigged prices, that are 
intended to mislead investors by artificially affecting market activity.”), citing Santa Fe Indus. v. Green, 430 
U.S. 462, 476 (1977).
331 See GFL, 272 F.3d 189, 205 (3d Cir. 2001), quoting Gurary v. Winehouse, 190 F.3d 37, 45 (2d Cir. 
1999) (“The gravamen of manipulation is deception of investors into believing that prices at which they 
purchase and sell securities are determined by the natural interplay of supply and demand, not rigged by 
manipulators.”).
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and In re Olympia Brewing Co. Securities Litigation.332 These decisions would have to 
be squared with any holding that short selling in violation of a securities purchase 
agreement is market manipulation, but this will be difficult to do.  For, as the GFL court 
identifies, these cases also indicate that market manipulation claims must show an effect 
on the marketplace.
Part V – Regulatory Issues
This paper has analyzed some of the common securities fraud claims made by 
issuers of Future Priced Securities, specifically, misrepresentation and market 
manipulation in violation of Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.  As 
indicated in Part III, these claims generally have merit and it therefore appears clear that 
death spiral litigation has a future in the district courts of the United States.  But there are 
also important regulatory issues arising out of concerns over Future Priced Securities that 
have not yet been discussed.  The problems caused by Future Priced Securities imply a 
need for some sort of regulatory response as FPS issuers appear to be routinely abused by 
the purchasers of these instruments.  This is a problem both for the issuers of these 
companies and for innocent shareholders who are victimized by the devaluation of their 
investments.333  But what is to be done?  
Future Priced Securities could simply be prohibited by state law—i.e., state 
corporate laws could be amended to prevent companies chartered there from issuing any 
securities that are convertible into a fixed value (as opposed to predetermined numbers) 
332
 See GFL, 272 F.3d 189, 204 (“Like the district court, GFL relies on Olympia Brewing, …, in which the 
district court emphasized that the ‘essential element’ of a market manipulation claims is the injection of 
‘inaccurate information’ into the market.”), citing In re Olympia Brewing Securities Litigation, 613 F. Supp. 
1286, 1292 (N.D. Ill. 1985).
333 See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
- 68 -
of shares.  But this appears to be an overly drastic response and would eliminate the 
valuable role that FPS’s play in financing.  Companies ought to be able to issue securities 
that provide investors with confidence that the value of their investment will be protected 
irrespective of fluctuations in the issuer’s stock price.  For small issuers that have limited 
financing choices, Future Priced Securities ought to be an available means of financing to 
continue operations.  The focus of regulation therefore should be to reduce the potential 
for abuse that now exists.  
The Securities and Exchange Commission, responding to complaints from issuers 
and investors about market abuses by naked short sellers, recently issued for comment 
Regulation SHO.334  If adopted as proposed, Regulation SHO will impact Future Priced 
Securities by overhauling short selling regulation.  There are two major changes proposed 
by Regulation SHO.  First, Regulation SHO proposes to abandon Rule 10a-1’s “tick test” 
in favor of a uniform “bid test” for exchange-traded and Nasdaq National Market 
Securities.335  This new bid test would be similar to NASD Rule 3350 and is designed to 
satisfy the same three rationales underlying Rule 10a-1.336  This change generally would 
not help issuers of Future Priced Securities, however, because the SEC has exempted the 
Nasdaq SmallCap, OTCBB, and Pink Sheets markets (where many FPS issuers trade) 
334 See SEC Proposed Regulation SHO, supra note 47, at 62974.
335 See SEC Proposed Regulation SHO, supra note 47, at 62980-81.
336 See id. at 62980 (“Under the proposed uniform bid test, the price at which a short sale could be effected 
would move contemporaneously with thee movement of the consolidated best bid.”).  Footnote 74 of 
Regulation SHO explains: “if the best bid in a security is $47.00, short selling would be allowed at $47.01 
or higher, regardless of whether the immediately preceding bid was $46.99 or $47.01 (i.e., it does not 
matter whether the current bid is an upbid or downbid from the immediately preceding bid).  Also, if the 
best bid in a security is $47.00, and the last trade price in the security was $47.05, short selling would be 
allowed at $47.01 or higher (i.e., last sale price is irrelevant).”  Id.  This new bid test differs from NASD 
Rule 3350, however, in that Rule 3350 focuses on upbids and downbids (i.e., allowing short sales that are 
upbids and prohibiting short sales that are downbids) while the new rule does away with this restriction.  
See id. 
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from this rule.337  Thus, many FPS issuers would continue to have no pricing rule to 
prevent downward pressure on their securities due to short selling.  
Instead, FPS issuers will have to rely on the second major change that would be 
effected by Regulation SHO, a uniform “locate” rule and “delivery” rule for brokers.338
The SEC is proposing new Rule 203, “a uniform ‘locate’ rule applicable to all equity 
securities, wherever they are traded.”339  This proposed rule would prevent naked short 
selling by requiring that brokers locate and annotate in writing prior to a short sale where 
securities are to be borrowed from.340  Furthermore, the SEC is proposing a new delivery 
rule “targeted at securities where there is evidence of significant settlement failures.”341
This rule would restrict short selling of securities where fails-to-deliver have 
accumulated,342 thereby helping prevent the abuses alleged by Future Priced Securities 
issuers like JAG Media Holdings.343  These new rules, applicable to all securities 
wherever traded, should help prevent death spirals.  For instance, the massive naked short 
selling alleged by JAG Media Holdings would become illegal.  Furthermore, other death 
spiral schemes would be made more difficult because the locate-and-deliver rules would 
preclude an FPS purchaser from relying on an FPS coming-due months in the future to 
337 See id. at 62981 (“We are not proposing at this time to extend the uniform bid test to securities not 
currently covered by a short sale price test (i.e., Nasdaq SmallCap, OTCBB, and Pink Sheet securities) in 
part because these markets have not been subject to the rule in the past.  More significantly, we believe that 
the proposed locate and deliver requirements may address many of the concerns regarding abusive short 
selling in thinly-capitalized securities trading over-the-counter.”).  
338 See id. at 62972.
339 Id. at 62976.
340 See id. 
341 Id. at 62976.
342 See id. at 62977 (“We are incorporating the same threshold currently used in NASD Rule 11830,50, 
i.e., any security where there are fails to deliver at a clearing agency registered with the Commission of 
10,000 shares or more per security, and that is equal to at least one-half of one percent of the issue's total 
shares outstanding.  …  The proposed rule would specify that for short sales of any security meeting this 
threshold, the selling broker-dealer must deliver the security no later than two days after the settlement 
date.”).
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cover current short sales.  Death spirals would still be possible, but would be made more 
difficult to effectuate.  
Part VI – Conclusion
This paper has shown that death spiral litigation has a clear future in United States
district courts.  Future Priced Securities issuers can sustain valid claims against the 
purchasers of these instruments for either misrepresentation or market manipulation in 
violation of Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act.  This would appear to be a just 
result.  The facts and schemes alleged in death spiral complaints strongly suggest that 
individuals who short-sell on the basis of an FPS are not arbitraging or trading on 
changed circumstances but instead have preconceived plans by which to profit from a 
position of power over the company.  And since Future Priced Securities have the 
potential to be useful financing instruments for small companies, regulators should ensure 
that these securities are not tools of abuse.  Regulation SHO, if adopted as proposed by 
the SEC, would be a substantial step in this direction.  
343 See supra notes 166-68 and accompanying text.
